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Abstract
Sociocognitive Development through a
Comparative Developmental Lens
Alyssa M. Arre
2021
Early human life is marked by robust developmental shifts in sociocognitive abilities.
While we know a lot about these developmental patterns in human primates, we know
relatively little about whether nonhuman primates share these early life trajectories. In this
dissertation I identify and explore three open questions using this comparative
developmental psychology method. In Chapter 2 (Arre, Clark, and Santos, 2020), I compare
the developmental trajectory of an early emerging theory of mind ability— the capacity to
represent what others see— in a primate species to the existing established trajectory in
human infants. In Chapter 3 (Arre, Stumph, & Santos, 2021), I look at the plasticity of this
same capacity to represent what others see by comparing adults of two closely-related
species that vary in their socioecology. These chapters together provide a new perspective
on how early life experiences and varying socioecologies affect the emergence of visual
perspective representing abilities. Finally, in Chapter 4 (Arre, Stumph, Hengartner, & Santos,
in prep), I examine how macaques develop an entirely different social ability, gaze following,
testing whether macaques share a human like tendency to attend to the information given
by more knowledgeable agents as compared to less knowledgeable agents. Across these
three experiments, I find that despite some developmental delays (Chapter 2), the ability to
represent what others see seems otherwise relatively adult-like even in early life, regardless
of different socioecological input (Chapter 3), or agent that subjects are representing the
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perspective of (Chapter 4). Taken together, my findings suggest that as compared to human
infants, young primates’ slowly developing social cognition might be a contributing factor to
sociocognitive differences we see in adult human and nonhuman primates.

(page 2 remains blank)

ii

Sociocognitive Development through a
Comparative Developmental Lens

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
Of
Yale University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Alyssa M. Arre

Dissertation Director: Laurie R. Santos

June 2021

iv

© 2021 by Alyssa M. Arre.
All rights reserved.

v

Table of Contents
ABSTRACT…….………………………………………………………………………………………………..….…………….. i
TABLE OF CONTENTS………..……………………………………………………………………………..….………..…….vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………………………………..….…..…….…….vii
LIST OF TABLES…….………………………..…………………………………………………………………………………xi
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………………………………..….………………xii
CHAPTER 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………..………….1
CHAPTER 2: Do young rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) know what others see?:
comparative developmental perspective……………………………………………….............38
CHAPTER 3: Macaques with varying social tolerance show no differences in
understanding what other agents perceive………………………………………...……………..……….70
CHAPTER 4: Do monkeys attend to age when gaze following?.....................................................115
CHAPTER 5: General Discussion and Conclusion……..…………………..………..….…………………174
REFERENCES FOR THE INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DISCUSSION………………………..….……..………..193

vi

Acknowledgements
When the process of graduate school gets really overwhelming, I try to remember
myself as a child, crouched in the dirt watching bugs, turtles, and frogs. These animals, with
the patience of my angel mother, would often make their way from the dirt to my childhood
bedroom where I could watch them up close. I think about how thrilled that person would
be to meet someone like me now, her future self, someone whose job it is to pursue her
curiosities and spends many days crouching in the dirt watching monkeys. This reality would
have been unfathomable to my child self, and would not have been possible without many
people that have led me along the way.
First and foremost, thank you to my advisor, Dr. Laurie Santos; there is nothing that I
could say here that would appropriately capture my gratitude for all that she has done for
me throughout graduate school and during my time working with her as a lab manager.
Laurie is an incredibly selfless and generous advisor, dedicating nights and weekends to
revising drafts and watching practice talks, and always a phone call away in times of crisis
or self-doubt. More than that, Laurie was an outstanding example of all that I hope to be as
an advisor and a science communicator, and I am grateful for all of the hours that she has
dedicated to my growth in these domains and as a scientist more broadly.
I am confident that I would not be where I am today without the guidance of Dr.
Alexandra Rosati. As an undergraduate research assistant, I spent a formative and
memorable field season working with Alex at Cayo Santiago. Alex taught me so much about
running experiments with primates and the field of primate cognition, about applying to
graduate school, and countless other life lessons. Throughout my entire academic career,

vii

Alex has been a mentor for many major milestones and has always been someone that I felt
like I could talk to whenever I needed guidance.
To my dissertation committee members, Drs. Steve Chang, Julian Jara-Ettinger, and
Frank Keil, thank you for your generosity and patience, the enthusiasm with which you’ve
always treated my research and my writing, and your encouragement. I especially want to
thank Julian, who has served on every single one of my academic committees since I started
in the department, and whose enthusiasm for statistics instilled in me so much joy for data
analysis from day one of my graduate career.
I want to thank the following past and present members of the Comparative Cognition
Lab at Yale: Alondra Arguello, Lindsey Drayton, Yiyun Huang, Miriam Ross, Amanda Royka,
Zach Silver, Ellen Stumph, and the many undergraduate research assistants that helped
collect data or code my projects. I walked away having learned something from every single
one of our conversations, and I am so fortunate to have been surrounded by so many
thoughtful and intelligent people in lab. Relatedly, I would also like to thank my funding
sources for the research that appears in this dissertation, including the Whitney and Betty
MacMillan Center for international and Area Studies at Yale, the Council on Latin American
& Iberian Studies at Yale, and the Yale Institute for Biospheric Studies.
During my time in graduate school, I spent a lot of my free time at the Yale Peabody
Museum of Natural History, volunteering, and later working, across a couple of different
departments within the museum. I learned so much about effective science communication
during this time, and spent many afternoons brainstorming new ways to engage the public
with the museum and natural history more broadly. I want to thank Arnie Heiser, David

viii

Heiser, Elizabeth Kennedy, Nicole Palffy-Muhoray, Jim Sirch, and Stephanie Wratten for all
that they have taught me and for their contagious enthusiasm for all things natural history.
The bulk of my data collection was conducted at the Cayo Santiago Biological Field
Station in Punta Santiago, Puerto Rico. To the staff and long-term field researchers, especially
Giselle Caraballo Cruz, Bianca Giura, Pedro Martes, Dra. Melween Martinez Rodriguez, Josue
Negron, Daniel Ortiz, Daniel Phillips, Julio Resto, Nahiri Rivera Barreto, Omar Rivera, Marcos
Rodriguez, Daniel Roman, Dra. Angelina Ruiz Lambides, and Jean Santos, thank you for
bringing your 110% to work every day and for all that you do for the monkeys. None of this
research would have been possible without you.
I am grateful for friends that I made in graduate school that helped shape the way I
think and many of whom I have so many fond memories exploring New Haven and Puerto
Rico with. Thank you, Rosie Aboody, Mikey Bogese, Chelsey Clark, Nicole Deziel, Erica
Dunayer, Astrid Hengartner, Daniel Horschler, Angie Johnston, and Lauren Petrullo, I do not
have the words to express what your friendship means to me. You have helped me through
some of the most challenging periods of my graduate career and of my life. I am a better
scientist, but more importantly, am a better person because of our conversations and all that
I have learned from you.
I have had the great fortune of maintaining a group of friends from my time as an
undergraduate at the University of Rochester who have supported me emotionally and
mentally on my graduate school journey. To Austin Davis, Bradley Kowalczyk, Jamie McCall,
Mark Rollfs, Brittany Straughn, Victoria Stepanova, Robbie Wright, Michael Yurkovic, every
minute of our decade-long friendship has been filled with so much gratitude. I thank the
universe every day for bringing you into my life. Thank you for always being there for me to

ix

talk and cry, for making me laugh, for encouraging me to live in the moment and get outside
and away from my computer once in a while, and for keeping me humble.
I would like to thank my family, who have supported me in so many different ways
through my education. I want to thank my aunt and uncle, Eileen and Rick, who helped me
so much with my undergraduate education and have always supported my dreams.
Additionally, I am grateful for my partner, Andrew, for his unwavering support and patience
throughout my years in graduate school; I do not think I could have asked for someone more
thoughtful and cannot imagine making it through the stress of this entire journey without
him. Finally, I am thankful for my sister, who has been a constant source of inspiration
throughout my life and graduate school career. I am so grateful for the years during graduate
school that we spent living together, and for all of the work breaks, trips home together, and
flowers to brighten my day.
From a young age, my mother fostered a love for learning in myself and my sister. Our
family’s joke is that she began reading to us before we were born. Though obvious hyperbole,
I think the sentiment here is that my mom went to the ends of the earth to encourage the
idea that all things are possible with education. Mom, thank you for the selflessness you have
shown to me and Ashley in raising us and ensuring the best educational opportunities for us
from the very beginning, for encouraging our creativity and curiosity, and most importantly,
for all the bugs, turtles, frogs (among other creatures) that you let me bring in the house.

x

List of Tables
Chapter 2:
Table 1…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………66
Chapter 3:
Table 1…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…110
SI Table 1…………………………..…………………………………………………………………………………….…111
Chapter 4:
Table 1…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…157
Table 2……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….158
SI Table 1…………………………..……………………………………………………………………………………….159
SI Table 2…………………………..……………………………………………………………………………………….160
SI Table 3…………………………..……………………………………………………………………………………….161

xi

List of Figures
Chapter 2:
Figure 1…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….………………...67
Figure 2…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….………………...68
Figure 3…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….…………….......69
Chapter 3:
Figure 1…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….………….…...112
Figure 2…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….………….…...113
SI Figure 3………………………………..……………………………………………………………..….………….…...114
Chapter 4:
Figure 1………………………………………………………………………………………………..….……………........162
Figure 2…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….…………........163
Figure 3…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….…………........164
Figure 4…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….…………........165
Figure 5…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….…………........166
Figure 6…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….…………........167
Figure 7…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….……………....168
Figure 8…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….……………....169
Figure 9…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….……………....170
Figure 10…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….………….…171
Figure 11…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….………….…172
Figure 12…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….……….....…173

xii

Chapter 1: Introduction
The field of cognitive psychology has long taken interest in the origins of human social
cognition. Typically, researchers investigating this question use human infants and children
to investigate the ontogenetic roots of social cognition. Experimenters test human infants
and children at different developmental stages to explore how experiences drive cognitive
developmental changes, allowing us to better understand the role that culture and learning
play on the developing human mind. However, other scientists explore the origins of human
social cognition by studying a different population: non-human primates (hereafter
primates). Studying primates allows scientists to piece together phylogenetic origins of
social cognition. Typically, researchers test adult primate subjects on a task of interest and
compare their results to those of human infants and children.
Testing the cognitive capacities of our closest living relatives allows researchers
insight into a number of questions about human cognition. First, studying primates allow us
to determine which cognitive abilities are unique to humans. This “human-uniqueness”
question has motivated the field of comparative cognition more broadly since its conception,
and work with primates is no exception. Additionally, primate work allows us to identify
which aspects of our social cognition are part of our core knowledge. Proposed first by
Spelke (2004), core knowledge theory proposes that humans are evolutionarily endowed
with a set of innate domains of knowledge that scaffolds much of our later developing
cognition (Spelke 2004; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007; Kinzler & Spelke, 2007). Since primates are
our closest living relatives, they are thought to possess many of the core knowledge
capacities that humans do. Thus, comparative investigations can provide a window into
which domains of core knowledge are conserved across phylogeny (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007).
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Additionally, primate research also allows us to investigate which cognitive capacities
might be present as a result of selective pressures acting on social group-living species. Over
millions of years, both human and non-human primates have had to navigate complicated
social relationships and interactions in order to succeed within their groups (Whiten &
Byrne, 1988; 1997). As such, investigating the capacities present in humans, primates, and
other social species, we gain a clearer picture of which abilities are critical to social living
(Whiten & Byrne, 1988). Finally, studying primates can help us to understand cognition in
its ancestral state in the primate lineage: our last common ancestor. By testing primates with
whom we last shared a common ancestor with between 10 and 30 million years ago (great
apes and monkeys, respectively), we can reconstruct the most likely cognitive state of the
common ancestor at each respective point (MacLean et al., 2012; Matsuzawa, 2012). Thus,
testing primates’ cognitive capacities can provide valuable insight into human cognitive
development and evolution.

Comparative Cognitive Development
Traditional comparative psychological has been instrumental in laying the
foundation for our understanding of the origins of human cognitive capacities. However, the
nature of this type of research results in a gap in our knowledge. By treating all subjects as
homogenous, regardless of age, sex, and other social factors (e.g., rank, social
connectedness), we may be missing out on an opportunity to better understand how
cognition varies as a function of function of age and individual differences. Specifically, while
we know much about what adult non-human social cognition looks like, we know little about
how it develops – ontogenetically – in primate subjects. Research comparing human children
2

and young primate subjects could therefore be insightful into the experiences required for
human-like social cognition.
Fortunately, within the last decade, there has been a movement to address this gap
using the tools of comparative developmental psychology (Matsuzawa, 2007; 2012; Rosati et
al., 2014; Nielsen and Haun, 2016). Comparative developmental psychology takes abilities
with a clear developmental trajectory in human children and investigates the developmental
trajectory of the same abilities in primate species. This comparison allows us to better
understand the time point in development at which the two species diverge. Other research
in this new domain examines two species with known different early life experiences and
investigates the potentially divergent outcomes of a particular related sociocognitive ability.
Before diving more deeply into what the comparative developmental approach has
taught us to date, it’s important to first clarify what we mean by developmental differences
across species. Human and non-human primate development can be compared using two
different kinds of metrics. The first metric involves using exact age differences to make
claims about developmental differences. For example, one could compare whether primate
subjects develop a specific cognitive capacity at an earlier or later age than humans do. For
example, if humans develop a given capacity at 6 months of age whereas primates do so at
one year of age, we might assume that primates have a slower developmental trajectory than
humans.
There are a few limitations to consider with this method of exact age comparison.
First, many primates’ lifespans are significantly abbreviated relative to those of humans;
humans can live to be over 100, but primates’ lifespans are often much shorter (McCowan et
al., 2016). As a result of this shortened lifespan, primates undergo most of their major life
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milestones at a much earlier age than humans: for instance, macaque monkeys are weaned
around one year of age and undergo sexual maturity by age five (Leigh, 2004; McCowan et
al., 2016). Unfortunately, this difference in the timing of lifetime milestones makes it difficult
to use exact age alone to compare the developmental trajectory of cognitive performance
across species— one might wind up inadvertently comparing two individuals at completely
different life stages, and with different absolute lifespans.
For this reason, many comparative developmental researchers have opted to use a
second metric for making developmental comparisons across species: matching individuals
across species based not on their age by on their life stage. Both human and non-human
primates undergo major life transitions like weaning and sexual maturity. Researchers can
then use these landmarks as markers to divide the lifespan into different life stages. In this
way, researchers tend to define pre-weaning as infancy, post-weaning to sexual maturity as
the juvenile period, and adulthood as any time after sexual maturity (Bogin, 2010). While this
is a method often used by researchers, it’s important to note that this metric does involve
losing some of the nuance in lifespan comparisons. For instance, menopause, a critical life
stage in humans that’s defined by decreased fertility and reproductive senescence, is not
shared by other primates (Hawkes et al., 1998; but see Altmann et al., 2010; Hawkes & Smith,
2010). Thus, comparing individuals at different life stages may fall short in case where those
life stages (e.g., senescence) look different across different species (e.g., menopausal older
women versus non-menopausal older primate females).
Another feature that must be taken into account by a comparative cognitive
development approach is the fact that human development is characterized by a prolonged
juvenile period (Kaplan et al., 2000; Bogin & Smith, 2000; Bogin, 2010)— one that is unlike
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that in any other primate species. Some scholars have proposed that our human-like
extended period of dependency on adults is an adaptation that allows young children to
refine socialization and cognitive skills with a parental safety net nearby (Bjorklund & Green,
1992; Janson & van Schaik, 1993; Kaplan et al., 2000). Thus, when considering the human
and non-human primate juvenile period, it is important to consider that these periods are of
much different lengths even if they are bookended by the same developmental milestones in
both subjects (Bogin, 2010).
Despite these limitations of different developmental metrics, comparative cognitive
development has been informative for a number of different areas of cognition research in
primates. As was the case with human developmental psychology, some of the earliest work
comparing young primate subjects to human infants examined questions in object reasoning
and understanding (Poti, 1997; Hayashi & Matsuzawa, 2003; Okamoto-Barth & Call, 2008;
Poti, Hayashi, & Matsuzawa, 2009; Langer 1993). In this area, researchers found that despite
lacking many of the experiences that human children have in early life with object play,
young primates still show many of the same patterns in object play as human children,
suggesting that some object reasoning skills are early emerging and highly phylogenetically
conserved.

Open Questions for Comparative Cognitive Development
Despite early successes from the comparative cognitive developmental approach,
there are still many areas of inquiry where this method of research is underutilized,
especially in the domain of social cognition. Humans and non-human primates share many
of the same adaptive pressures as a product of their sociality, however, they differ drastically
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in the types of early life experience (Tomasello, 2020), especially when it comes to how
humans begin to attend to and learn from others. Thus, comparative cognitive development
is an exciting approach for exploring phylogenetic discrepancies in the outcomes of a
sociocognitive ability. Specifically, comparing the pace and timing of the development of a
capacity can help us better understand which experiences in early development are critical
to the emergence of social cognition in humans, and which abilities are conserved across
phylogeny regardless of experiential input.
In this thesis, I will use a comparative developmental approach to explore the
development of two different social cognitive capacities in primates— theory of mind
abilities and social learning capacities. I begin with a review of work in the domain of theory
of mind. Specifically, I review what developmental psychologists have learned about the
ontogeny of theory of mind in humans, and also what comparative researchers have learned
about the existence of these mentalizing capacities in adult primates. I also explore several
hypotheses about how different social systems may have shaped these capacities. I then turn
to the second domain, social learning, reviewing both what we know about the ontogeny of
these capacities in humans and the extent to which adult primates share these abilities.
Together this section sets the stage for why these domains are ideal for the comparative
developmental approach, before

Theory of Mind
Infant theory of mind
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Researchers in developmental psychology have explored the ontogeny of theory of
mind, or the ability think about the perceptions, intentions, goals, knowledge, and beliefs, in
other words, the mental states, of other agents. To test these questions, researchers have
used both implicit and explicit measures of theory of mind representations. Some of the
earliest work in human theory of mind work focused on capturing children’s
representational abilities explicitly— having children act on the basis of their mental state
representations or plainly state what they thought the mental states of another agent might
be. Many of these explicit studies have focused on testing children’s understanding of one
representational capacity in particular— their understanding of another agent’s beliefs (e.g.,
Siegal and Beattie, 1991; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Wellman and Bartsch, 1988; Bartsch and
Wellman, 1989). The classic version of this sort of task involves a change of location, where
the child witnesses the movement of an object from one location to another, out of the view
of another agent in the scene (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Children are then asked where
they think the agent will look for the object. Consistently, after age four (Wellman, Cross, &
Watson, 2001), children report that they think the experimenter will look for the object in
the original location, where the object has been moved from. Developmental psychologists
have argued that the pattern of results from explicit tasks like show that children begin to
represent other agents’ beliefs from around four years of age (Wellman et al., 2001).
Unfortunately, explicit methods can only be used with verbal children, thus limiting the
ages that can be tested using these methods. Later work building off of these original studies
sought to capture the implicit representational abilities of pre-verbal infants. Developmental
psychologists have used a few different implicit methods to test infants’ understanding of
other’s mental states. One commonly method— looking time or violation of expectancy
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paradigm — is a measure first used to test questions about infants’ visual perception
(Berlyne, 1958; Fantz, 1958). This method uses a natural behavior of infants; that is, when
surprised, infants will look longer at an object or scenario. The looking time task, has been
extended to test infants’ understanding of objects and object properties (e.g., Baillargeon
1986; Spelke et al., 1992; Baillargeon, 1995; Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999; Surian & Caldi,
2010), numerical sets and their relationships (e.g., Wynn, 1992; McCrink & Wynn, 1994), and
other agents and their mental states (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Csibra et al., 2003; Luo,
2011; Woodward, 1998). Critically, this method makes three key assumptions. First, infants
must be able to form expectations about the outcome of a scenario. Additionally, infants must
be able to detect when something unexpected occurs. And finally, infants should look longer,
measured in overall looking time, in response to a violation of their expectation.
During looking time tests of theory of mind capacities, infant participants are shown a
scenario that depicts another agents’ mental state— typically what another agent sees,
knows, or believes about the location of a hidden object. Participants then watch as the agent
act either consistently (expected) or inconsistently (unexpected) with their own mental
states. If infants are capable of forming a representation of the other agents’ mental states,
then they should look longer when the agent behaves unexpectedly based on those mental
states.
Using looking time measures, researchers have revealed that human infants seem to
have an earlier developmental trajectory of understanding of mental states than explicit
verbal tasks suggested. From around 6 months of age, infants seem to represent what others
can and can’t see (e.g., Kim & Song, 2015) and understand that agents can be ignorant (e.g.,
Luo & Johnson, 2009). There is also looking time evidence that infants in the first year of life
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look longer when another agent acts inconsistently with her own beliefs (Onishi &
Baillargeon, 2005; Surian et al., 2007; Kovács. Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Traüble et al., 2010;
Luo, 2011; He et al., 2011; Barrett et al., 2013; Choi & Lui, 2015; Scott, 2017, but see Powell
et al., 2018; Dörrenberg, Rakoczy, & Liskowski, 2018; Poulin-Dubois, Polonia, & Yott, 2013;
Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016 for failures to find these effects).
Another measure used to test infants’ theory of mind capacities is anticipatory looking.
Here, the term anticipatory looking refers to the look a participant makes towards the
intended location of a goal directed action. The logic of this task is that infants will look to
where they anticipate an action occurring. Anticipatory looking methods have been applied
the same theory of mind questions as the violation of expectancy paradigm. In fact, studies
using anticipatory looking have shown that infants predict that an agent who possesses
knowledge or beliefs about the location of a hidden object will act on the basis of those beliefs
(Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; He, Boltz, & Baillargeon, 2012; Clements & Perner, 1994;
Neumann, Thoemer, & Sodian, 2008; but see Dörrenberg, Rakoczy, & Liskowski, 2018;
Wiesmann, et al., 2018; Kulke et al., 2018; Kampis et al., 2020 for failures to see these effects).
Studies using both looking time (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber,
2007; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Träuble, Marinović, & Pauen, 2010; Luo, 2011; He,
Boltz, & Baillargeon, 2011; Barret et al., 2013; Choi & Lui, 2015; Scott, 2017) and anticipatory
looking (Southgate et al., 2007; He, Boltz, & Baillargeon, 2012; Clements & Perner, 1994;
Neumann, Thoemer, & Sodian, 2008) have shown that infants are able to represent what
others see, know, and believe, but there has recently been some controversy regarding the
validity of both methods, particularly when it comes to studies testing whether infants
understand what other agents believe (Baillargeon, Buttleman, & Southgate, 2018; Poulin-
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Dubois et al., 2018; Powell et al., 2018). Indeed, a growing number of studies have failed to
replicate the finding that infants represent what others believe, both when using violation of
expectancy methods (Powell et al., 2018; Dörrenberg, Rakoczy, & Liskowski, 2018; PoulinDubois, Polonia, & Yott, 2013; Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016) and when using anticipatory
looking (Dörrenberg, Rakoczy, & Liskowski, 2018; Wiesmann, et al., 2018; Kulke et al., 2018;
Kampis et al., 2020; Burnside et al., 2018). Taken together, these results suggest two things.
First, more work is needed to very that infants represent others’ beliefs early on in human
development. Second, there is a need for rigorous pre-registration of the methods and
samples used in these studies and research in developmental psychology more broadly to
improve the reliability of publications moving forward (Rubio-Fernandez, 2019).

Non-human primate theory of mind
More than four decades ago, Premack & Woodruff (1978) first posed the question of
whether chimpanzees possessed a theory of mind. Their fundamental work attempted to
investigate the mentalizing abilities of a single chimpanzee, and found that their subject was
capable of recognizing the experimenter’s mental states (i.e., his intentions), as well as what
was needed in order to fulfill the experimenter’s goal. Although Premack and Woodruff
argued that these findings were evidence for primate theory of mind abilities, many debated
Premack & Woodruff’s initial interpretation of these findings (e.g., Dennett, 1978; Pylyshyn,
1978). Nonetheless, Premack & Woodruff’s seminal paper and the critiques that it received
revolutionized the study of theory of mind in human populations and launched a long line of
work investigating the mentalizing capacities of human primates (see reviews in Rosati,
Santos, & Hare, 2010; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Krupenye & Call, 2019).
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In line with the infant work, much work in primate theory of mind uses implicit
measures to test what primate subjects know about other agents’ mental states. Many
primate theory of mind studies to date have used a looking time violation of expectancy
paradigm. Similar to when using this method in infants, researchers assume that primate
subjects will look longer when an unexpected event occurs as compared to when an
unsurprising expected event occurs. Using this method, researchers have to date tested
questions about what primates understand about what other agents perceive, know, and
believe (Marticorena et al., 2011; Martin & Santos, 2014; Drayton & Santos, 2018; Horschler,
Santos, & MacLean, 2019; for a review, see Drayton & Santos, 2016). More recently, a related
implicit measure, anticipatory looking, has been adapted for primate populations as well
(Hopper et al., 2020; Krupenye and Call, 2019). Using eye tracking software, scientists are
able to capture primates’ specific looking behavior as they watch videos of agents acting in
accordance or at odds with their beliefs. This method has to date mostly been used to test
how primates represent others’ beliefs (Krupenye et al., 2016; Kano et al., 2019).
In addition to these implicit measures, primate researchers have also used explicit
measures to test primate theory of mind as well. Note however that such explicit measures
are often very different than the verbal methods used to test children’s theory of mind
capacities. Primate explicit measures are typically nonverbal tasks that require subjects to
act on the basis of their own understanding of another agent’s mental state. Many of these
tasks involve competitive situations in which subjects must take into account what other
agents see, know, or believe when competing for resources (Bräuer et al., 2007; Hare et al.,
2000; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Kaminski et al., 2009; Flombaum & Santos, 2005;
Santos, Nissen, & Ferrugia, 2006; Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008; Krachun et al., 2009;
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see Hare & Tomasello, 2004 and Lyons & Santos, 2006 for a review of these competitive
tasks).
Using both implicit and explicit tasks, primate researchers have learned a lot about
the representations that adult primates use to think about the minds of others. The resulting
findings can perhaps best be understood as showing that primates possess at least three
separate mentalizing abilities: representing others’ perceptions, representing others’
knowledge and ignorance, and (perhaps most controversially) representing others’ beliefs.

Representing others’ perceptions
Researchers have long considered attention to others’ faces and direction of gaze to
be a foundational skill needed for a rich understanding of others’ perceptions (Wellman,
2011; Shepherd, 2010). For this reason, much of the early empirical work testing primates’
understanding of others’ perceptions began by exploring whether primates are able to follow
the gaze of another individual. This work has shown that gaze following is widespread across
the primate order, with many species of primates naturally following the gaze of conspecifics
and human experimenters (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 1998:
Tomasello, Call, and Hare 1998; Emery et al., 1997; Burkart and Heschl, 2006; Neiworth et
al., 2002; Shepherd and Platt, 2008; Sandel, MacLean, and Hare, 2011; Ruiz, Roeder, and
Byrne, 2009, for a review, see Rosati & Hare, 2009). More recently, primate researchers have
developed more complex gaze following tasks, ones that require subjects to follow gaze
towards a specific target object, often around a barrier or through a window. Such new
geometric gaze following tasks require subjects to recognize that there is a referent to an
agent’s gaze or that the agent is aware of something, not just looking in some direction
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(Tomasello et al., 1999; Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007; MacLean
and Hare 2012; Bettle and Rosati, 2019; Amici et al., 2009).
Evidence that primates can accurately predict how another agent will act based on
their perceptions also comes from violation of expectation tasks (Marticorena et al., 2011;
Martin & Santos, 2014; Drayton & Santos, 2018; Horschler, Santos, & MacLean, 2019; for a
review, see Drayton & Santos, 2016). In one study (Marticorena et al., 2011), rhesus monkeys
watched as a human agent saw an object slide into one of two boxes. The agent then
performed one of two actions: she reached into the box with the object (which should be
consistent with her perception that the object is in the box) or she reached into the empty
box (and thus acted inconsistently with respect to her perception of the object’s location).
Marticorena and colleagues found that macaques looked longer at the unexpected condition
in which the experimenter reached towards the empty box, suggesting that they expect
agents to act in accord with their visual awareness. Thus, given evidence from both explicit
and implicit tasks, it appears that primates are capable of representing the perceptions of
others and using this information to make predictions about other agents’ behavior.

Representing others’ knowledge and ignorance
As a socially living primate, representing what others can see will only get you so far,
as many of our social interactions and relationships also depend on understanding what
others know. Researchers have thus also focused on testing whether primates can represent
the knowledge of others using both explicit and implicit tasks. This work has shown that
many primate species are capable of forming such representations and predicting how
others should act based on their understanding. In one explicit test of primates’ knowledge
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representations, Kaminski and colleagues (2008) tested chimpanzee pairs, one subject and
one “competitor” in a food baiting task. In the task, experimenters surreptitiously baited a
set of cups with food and the subject and competitor had to select which cup they thought
the food was under. Importantly, experimenters varied the knowledge state of the
competitor chimpanzee to investigate whether the subject chimpanzee would choose
differently depending on what the competitor did and didn’t know about the location of the
hidden food. Specifically, while both the subject and competitor witnessed the baiting of a
first cup, only the subject witnessed the baiting of the second the cup. When the subject was
allowed to choose which cup they would like to retrieve food, subjects significantly chose the
cup that they alone knew had food inside (Kaminski et al., 2008). The authors of the
experiment took this pattern of performance as evidence that the chimpanzees could
represent the knowledge and ignorance states of their competitors
Previous studies using implicit tasks have also tested the robustness of primates’
knowledge representations. For instance, Drayton and Santos (2018) found that primates
expect others’ to dynamically update their knowledge, even in the case of object movement.
In their experiment, a macaque subject watched as an experimenter baited one of two boxes
with a piece of food. The monkey and the experimenter then watched as a platform under
the two boxes rotated such that each box moved its position by 180 degrees. Despite the
objects’ movements monkeys expected the experimenter to look for the item where she
knows it to be— in its new location— rather than in the empty box that is now in the original
position of the hiding location. These results suggest that monkeys successfully predict that
an agent’s knowledge will survive simple spatial transformations.
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Other work has tested how primates represent others’ knowledge and ignorance in a
more naturalistic gaze following task (Drayton & Santos, 2017). In this task, macaque
subjects saw an experimenter gasp as she looked to one side. The question of interested was
how subjects would follow her gaze. Critically, the researchers manipulated the identity of
an object in the path of the experimenter’ gaze cue. In one condition, the object remained the
same throughout the experiment— the experimenter should have already known about it—
but in a critical test condition, the identity of the object changed out of view of the
experimenter. In the condition in which the object’s identity remained the same, subjects
were faster to gaze follow beyond the target object, as though the experimenter must be
surprised by something off on the periphery. In contrast, when the target object had a new
identity, the monkeys gazed followed to the object— if the experimenter didn’t know about
this new object, she must be looking at it. These results converge with those in the other
implicit task, suggesting that primate subjects can appropriately predict how an agent should
act based on her knowledge (what she has seen before) and based on her ignorance (what
she hadn’t seen before).

Representing others’ beliefs
For humans, understanding others’ perceptions and knowledge states are only part
of the mentalizing story— as humans we also spend considerable time thinking what other
agents’ beliefs and how these subjective (and sometimes incorrect) beliefs might influence
their behavior. But do primates share these human-like representations? Similar to work
with human infants, researchers have tested primate false belief understanding using both
explicit and implicit tasks. The earliest work exploring false belief capacities in primates
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tested these abilities in the context of an explicit competitive food task. Kaminski, Call, and
Tomasello, (1999) tested two chimpanzees on a turn-taking game in which they manipulated
how much information each subject had about the content of three buckets on the table.
Specifically, the researchers tested whether one chimpanzee (the subject) would change
their choice behavior in response to what the other chimpanzee (the competitor) was aware
of (Study 1) and believed (Study 2). When required to act in accordance with another agent’s
belief state, their behavior did not differ from their behavior in the ignorant condition of
Study 1. In other words, subjects failed to represent the false belief of the competitor, and
instead, were treating the agent as if they had no information about the content of the
buckets at all. Others have tested chimpanzees’ false belief representational abilities using
similar competitive tasks with convergent results (Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Kaminski,
Call, & Tomasello, 2008; Krachun et al., 2009; Krachun, Call, & Tomasello, 2010). While these
studies suggest that apes are incapable of acting on false belief representations, they do not
preclude the possibility that primates are capable of representing the beliefs of others, but
incapable of acting on those representations.
To address this apparent failure to represent others’ beliefs, other work has tested
primates’ mentalizing abilities using implicit measures. For instance, using the expectancy
violation paradigm borrowed from developmental psychology (e.g., Onishi and Baillargeon,
2005), Marticorena and colleagues (2011) presented rhesus monkeys with a scene in which
an agent watched an object move between two possible locations. After the agent saw the
object enter one of the two boxes, her visual perspective was blocked and the subject monkey
alone watched as the object switched locations. If subjects represent that the agent now has
a false belief, they should be surprised and subsequently look longer when the agent reaches
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into the box containing the object than when she reaches towards the box where she last saw
the object (i.e., acting consistently with her false belief). In contrast to the performance of
human infants (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), monkeys seem to show no prediction about
where the experimenter will reach, looking for the same duration of time when she reaches
to either box. Other looking time studies of false beliefs (Martin & Santos, 2014) have found
similar failures when primates are allowed to automatically encode others’ false beliefs (see
Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010, for a human infant version of this study).
To date, only two studies provide positive evidence that nonhumans can track others’
false beliefs, and both use the same method: anticipatory looking (Krupenye et al. 2016, Kano
et al. 2019). In the first of two studies (Krupenye et al., 2016) chimpanzees watched videos
of a human in an ape suit moving between different locations (or moving an object to
different locations) and manipulated the amount of information a second agent in the video
knew about the location of the first agent (or object). Critically, when the second agent in the
video possessed a false belief about the location of the first agent (or the object), subjects
made more anticipatory looks to the location where the second agent falsely believed the
first agent (or object) to be. Researchers took this to mean that chimpanzees indeed have
false belief representational abilities (Krupenye et al., 2016), and had a few explanations for
why subjects in previous work had failed to show the same pattern of behavior. Krupenye
and colleagues suggest that abilities are fragile, and are elicited only when the chimpanzee
is adequately stimulated; in other words, the social drama of the stimuli used in Krupenye et
al. 2016 was a prerequisite for eliciting chimpanzee false belief representational abilities.
However, this suggestion would not explain chimpanzees’ previous failures on tasks
requiring them to act on their false beliefs, in presumably sufficiently stimulating social
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situations they faced in earlier tasks using competitive measures (Kaminski, Call, &
Tomasello, 1999; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008; Krachun
et al., 2009; Krachun, Call, & Tomasello, 2010).
Krupenye and colleagues (2016, 2019) have explained apes’ previous failures on
explicit tasks testing false belief representations (Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 1999; Hare,
Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008; Krachun et al., 2009; Krachun,
Call, & Tomasello, 2010), by arguing that apes do not have sufficient executive function to act
on their false belief representations. However, we know from decades of research in this
domain that chimpanzees exhibit inhibitory control consistent with that of children old
enough to pass explicit false belief tasks (Rosati et al., 2007; Evans & Beran, 2007), so it
seems unlikely that apes would possess false belief representational abilities but would be
unable to act on them, especially in competitive food sharing tasks that have proved critical
for eliciting the extent of chimpanzees’ cognitive abilities (Hare & Tomsello 2004).
Further, evolutionarily it is unclear how natural selection would act on an ability to
represent others’ beliefs that had no obvious fitness outcome in terms of the agents’ actions.
Simply being aware of another agent’s belief state, but not possessing the ability to act based
on this belief, would not allow the individual to benefit from the belief state representation.
In humans, we know that from a young age, infants seem capable of implicit false belief
representations, but these early emerging implicit abilities set the stage for later emerging
explicit false belief representations where children can act based on others’ beliefs (Scott &
Baillargeon, 2017; Wellman & Liu, 2004). So, while young preverbal infants cannot act
explicitly on the content of their false belief representations, they will eventually be able to
use these representations to accurately predict the actions of other agents (Onishi &
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Baillargeon, 2005). However, this is not the case in other primates. To date, there have been
no “positive” results of apes capable of acting on the content of their belief representations
(Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 1999; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Kaminski, Call, &
Tomasello, 2008; Krachun et al., 2009; Krachun, Call, & Tomasello, 2010), even though recent
work has hinted that they at least possess these representations and can accurately predict
agent behavior based on the subjects’ representations of another agent (Krupenye et al.,
2016; Kano et al., 2019). Whether agent behavior prediction is a sufficient benefit of a
capacity to represent the false beliefs of others is an open question, especially given subjects’
inability to act based on these predictions in contexts requiring subjects to participate
(Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 1999; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Kaminski, Call, &
Tomasello, 2008; Krachun et al., 2009; Krachun, Call, & Tomasello, 2010). Thus, while two
recent studies (Krupenye et al., 2016; Kano et al., 2019) propose that apes do have implicit
belief representational abilities, decades of work from apes previously warrant some caution
in making any definitive claims.
The above review of four decades of work in the domain of primate theory of mind
illustrates that while adult primates share much in common with humans, there is still some
controversy about whether they share a human-like understanding of others’ beliefs. Some
have proposed theories that provide mechanistic explanation for this disparity in primate
mentalizing (e.g., the awareness relations theory, see Martin & Santos, 2016), though these
theories to date do not clarify why adult primates seem to show differences in their
mentalizing abilities. Fortunately, comparative developmental psychology may provide tools
to help us better understand this discrepancy. Drawing on inspiration from human
developmental psychology approaches that have established a developmental trajectory of
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different sociocognitive abilities in human infants (Wellman & Liu, 2004), including
comparing infants of different ages on the same or theoretically similar tasks, comparative
developmental psychology is well-positioned to answer this question. To date, primate social
cognition research has offered is a snapshot into adult primate cognition, without
consideration into how these abilities may change across the lifespan. Therefore, addressing
this gap in our understanding could be informative for why we see the difference in adult
primates. By better understanding the pace, order, and timing of early emerging abilities in
young primates, we can perhaps illuminate why primate subjects are never capable of belief
understanding.
Given the uncertainty in both the developmental and comparative literatures
regarding nonverbal populations’ abilities to form belief state representations, we chose to
focus on a more basic theory of mind capacity in primates: the ability to represent what
others can see. In addition to this early emerging ability being a precursor to later developing
mentalizing capacities like representing others desires, intentions, knowledge, and beliefs,
(Wellman, 2002; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), we have already well documented work
from primate populations that by adulthood, they do possess the ability to represent others’
visual perspective (Marticorena et al., 2011; Arre, Stumph, & Santos, 2021). Thus, we believe
the ability to represent what others can see is particularly well suited to test open questions
in theory of mind using the comparative developmental method (Chapter 2; Arre, Clark, &
Santos, 2020).

Socioecology and Cognitive Development
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Typically, we think of primate cognition as fairly stable across species, with little
interspecies variation. However, closely related species vary a lot in terms of their
environmental and social factors. By comparing the cognitive abilities of adult primates that
vary in their social and environmental histories, researchers can test more specific
hypotheses about how human cognition has evolved. Take for example questions about the
nature of early human sociality and social cognition: many different theories about the
specific circumstances that have led to human-like cognition. Primates are uniquely poised
to answer this question, due in part, to their diversity in their social groups, social structures,
and social environments, and the obvious implications that these tests have for learning
more about our own evolution (MacLean et al., 2012).
Below I review several aspects of primates’ early social environments that vary across
different primate species. By comparing the social cognitive abilities of individuals with
these different early life experiences, we can test whether certain experience allow
individuals to develop more sophisticated cognitive skills.

Social group size
One of the most fundamental aspects of primate’s social life that varies across species
is group size— some primates (e.g., orangutans) live relatively solitary lives, while some live
in small family units (e.g.., Callitrichids), whereas other species live in large groups with more
than a hundred individuals (e.g., rhesus macaques). In general, researchers have living in big
social groups is beneficial for finding and monopolizing resources, warding off predators,
and for increased mating opportunities. However, there are many challenges to group living
as well, including navigating social relationships and competing for sometimes limited
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resources with other conspecifics. How does this large group living change the way animals
represent the social world? Early animal intelligence investigated exactly this relationship,
and looked whether living in a large group improved a species’ social cognition. In early
studies, Dunbar famously found that socially or group living species had bigger brains than
their closely related but more solitary living counterparts (Dunbar, 1998), a phenomenon
which he explained using his coined term the ‘social brain hypothesis’. Dunbar explained that
larger brains were needed for group living, as small brains put a constraint on important
skills for group living like relationship tracking, relationship management, and navigating
social interactions (Dunbar, 1998). While primates are generally known to have large brains
as compared to other vertebrate species (Dunbar, 1998; Dunbar & Shultz, 2007), later work
found that group size played a role not just in brain size, but with brain region changes too.
Specifically, the prefrontal cortex, a region implicated in a lot of human-unique capacities
like mindreading, mental time travel, and planning, is also proportionally larger in apes and
humans as compared to less social species such as those small pair or family living species,
like tamarins and marmosets, found across the Americas. (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007).
Some work has also tested the role that group size plays in social cognition. Largely
this work has been conducted within the lemur genus— while lemurs are closely related
(Hovarth et al., 2008), they vary drastically in their group size (Richard & Dewar, 1991).
Some species, like the mongoose lemur, live in small family groups of typically a breeding
pair and their offspring (Curtis & Zaramody, 1999). Alternatively, other species, such as the
ring-tailed lemur, can live in groups of up to 50 individuals (Sauther et al., 1999). In
comparative testes of lemur cognition, researchers have found that social cognition scales
with typical group size (MacLean et al., 2013), such that lemur species like the ring-tailed
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lemur are better at using experimenters’ visual perspective to obtain a reward in social
cognition tasks than small group living species like the mongoose lemur (MacLean et al.,
2013; Sandel, MacLean, & Hare, 2011). Importantly these results do not translate to
experiments testing nonsocial cognition, suggesting that the “boost” that lemur species’ get
from group living is domain specific – experience interpreting the relationships and cues of
others’ results in better sociocognitive abilities and not better cognition overall (MacLean et
al., 2013).

Social group structure
Although the social brain hypothesis argues that primate species with larger group
sizes will have more complex social cognitive abilities there are some species with typically
small groups seem to violate the rule. That is, there are species characterized by monogamy
and small nuclear family units, such as humans, who have larger brains than species with
different types of mating systems like multi-male/multi-female, or harem type social
structures (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007; Shultz & Dunbar, 2007). What makes these species the
exception to the social brain hypothesis rule? Researchers have proposed that living
successfully in a pair bond comes with many challenges: the relationship management skills
required for social living more generally are intensified in a close relationship, and further,
choosing a partner with which to pair bond is a very risky decision, as the pressure to select
a high-quality other is high (Burkart, Hrdy, & Van Schaik, 2009). Under this account, one
might predict that increased sociocognitive abilities would track with a species’ pair bonded
status, where we would see increased social skills critical for effective relationship
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management and mate choice, like emotional regulation, facial recognition, and kin
recognition.
While very little work has tested this hypothesis directly, there has been much
research with both pair bonding species of primates and polygamous primate species. Early
work in social cognition within pair bonding species has looked at callitrichid monkeys like
the tamarins and marmosets (Huber & Voelkl, 2009; Snowdon. 2001). In one such study,
researchers tested whether tamarins were capable of using an experimenters’ visual
perspective to make predictions about her behavior (Santos & Hauser, 1999). In the task,
tamarins were capable of using head position and gaze position to predict an agent’s actions.
However, gaze position was not a sufficient cue; subjects did not differentiate the
experimenters’ consistent and inconsistent actions when the experimenter used eye position
alone to indicate her attention. Other work has looked at gibbons, another primate species
known for pair-bonding (Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2020). In a related task borrowed from work
with non-pairbonded macaques (Flombaum & Santos, 2005), researchers tested the degree
to which gibbons would use different attentional cues (body position, head position, eyes)
when deciding who to steal from (Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2020). Like non-pairbonded
macaques, gibbons were capable of using body position to determine which experimenter
from whom they should take food – taking food significantly more from the experimenter
oriented away from them as compared to the one facing them. However, gibbons were
incapable of using eyes alone, and did not steal any more from a person whose eyes were
closed, as compared to a person whose eyes were open. While not a direct test of
monogamous gibbons and polygamous macaques, non-pairbonded macaques do
outperform gibbons here, as they are able to correctly exploit the attentional cues of humans
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to steal regardless of how subtle those cues are (e.g., eyes open or eyes closed), (Flombaum
& Santos, 2005). These findings are convergent with other work suggesting that pairbonded
species do not seem to be especially good at representing the visual perspective of others
(Liebal & Kaminski, 2012; Yocom, 2010; Santos & Hauser, 1999).
It is important to state that the “negative” findings presented here do not preclude
the possibility that pair bonded primate species do have improved social cognition relative
to non-pairbonded species. It is possible that the right kind of social cognitive skills have yet
to be tested. For instance, early work showing the correlation of large brain size with pair
bonded species proposed that we would similarly see social skills beneficial to relationship
selection and management in these species (Dunbar & Schultz, 2007). Understanding others’
visual perspective may not be the right type of capacity to test, and future work should look
more deeply into how species with varying mating systems differ in their abilities using tasks
more relevant to these species social living (Miller et al., 2016), like the propensity for
prosociality (Mercier, Witczak, & Bales, 2020; Burkhart & Finkenwirth, 2015).

Social environment
Another factor to consider when thinking about the social factors affecting social
cognition in primate species is a species’ social tolerance. Social tolerance refers to the level
of aggressive versus affiliative interactions between group members (Thierry, 2007). Social
tolerance is posited to play a role in the evolution of a species’ social cognition because
species with varying social environments, and subsequently different social interactions, will
have different experiential input from interacting with conspecifics. At present, there are two
competing hypotheses for how social tolerance played a role in early human evolution. One
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hypothesis that seeks to address this question, the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis,
argues that these challenges are exactly what make us, and our closest living primate
relatives, so socially intelligent (Whiten & Byrne, 1997). As a factor of our large group living,
individuals survive by exploiting the perceptions, knowledge, and beliefs of others, in order
to maximize food, shelter, and mating opportunities. As a result, the most successful
individuals are those that are socially intelligent, and are capable of out-competing
conspecifics for resource opportunities. An alternative and more recent hypothesis, the
Survival of the Friendliest or Social Tolerance Hypothesis paints a rosier picture of early
human life. Instead of competition, Hare & Woods (2020) argue that it is our natural
inclination to work together, to help and cooperate, that leads to human-like social cognition.
Cooperation, social tolerance, and considering others’ perceptual perspectives and beliefs
are hallmarks of human culture (Herrmann et al., 2007).
Critically, these hypotheses make specific predictions about a particular suite of
sociocognitive abilities. Mentalizing abilities, including perspective, knowledge, and belief
representational abilities, are heavily implicated in both hypotheses as mechanisms by
which individuals are capable of exploiting or cooperating with conspecifics. Thus, the tools
of comparative cognitive development provide a mechanism to distinguish between these
hypotheses. Specifically, we can compare closely related primate species that vary in their
degree of social tolerance on their social cognition, to determine under what conditions
human mentalizing abilities are more likely to have evolved. In primates, social tolerance
refers to the degree to which species vary in their rates of aggression: some species are more
despotic, characterized by their high and unbalanced rates of aggression, low rates of
reconciliation, kinship bias for affiliative interactions than other more tolerant species
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(Aureli et al. 1997; Thierry 1985). By testing adult monkeys that have grown up under very
different social circumstances, we can look at the effects of each type of social environment
on that species’ social abilities. In abstract, when you vary the influences on the trajectory,
what happens to the outcome?
The ideal candidate for answering this question is visual perspective taking since each
hypothesis sets up a different prediction for which factors should drive the development of
visual perspective taking skills. If experience with competition and exploitation of others’
perceptions be more conducive to human-like visual perspective taking abilities, then we
would expect that a primate species with low levels of social tolerance, and thus, more
experience in early life using the visual access of others for their own personal gain, to show
better visual perspective taking abilities. Alternatively, and more in line with the Social
Tolerance hypothesis, cooperation and high social tolerance may breed superior visualperspective taking abilities. Thus, by testing two species that vary in their social tolerance, I
can investigate exactly the types of early life experiences are more in line with the conditions
required for advanced visual perspective taking abilities.

Elements of Primate Social Learning
Social learning broadly encompasses all learning from other agents, and has been
proposed as one of the benefits of otherwise costly group living, as increased conspecifics
means increased opportunities to learn about the environment with the help of other agents.
Though organisms across the animal kingdom are faced with a similar challenge of having to
learn how to navigate a complex environment, and would benefit greatly from the ability to
learn from and teach others and pass this knowledge from one generation to another, no
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other species has developed as sophisticated (Csibra, 2007; Whiten, 2000; Tomasello,
Kruger, & Ratner, 1993; Whiten & van de Waal, 2017) an ability to teach and learn from
others as effectively as humans.
Although primates are more limited than humans in the domains in which they
socially learn from others, primates do appear capable of learning from others in tool use
and skill learning contexts. Some of this investigated differences in rates of social learning in
a tool use task between human children and chimpanzees, and found that both children and
chimpanzees performed better on the task when they saw the demonstrator performing the
action, suggesting that both populations learned something from witnessing the
demonstration (Nagell, Olguin, & Tomasello, 1993), though they differed in the fidelity with
which they copied the demonstration. The task revealed that while chimpanzees could
socially learn a specific outcome, they did not copy the speciific process the demonstrator
used. Later work with chimpanzees (Myowa-Yamakoshi & Matsuzawa, 2000; 1999; Whiten
et al., 2009; Whiten, Horner, & Marshall-Pescini, 2005) and other apes (Stoinksi et al., 2001;
Stoinski & Whiten, 2003) found convergent results. While human children seem attuned to
the demonstrator’s actions, human primates are not. At least in these task-learning contexts,
primates seem too distracted by the goal of the task outcome to attend and mimic the
demonstration of the task expert, copying only the behaviors required to “pass” the task.
Given these results, one might not predict the identity of the demonstrator to matter
to the learner, as it seems that nonhuman subjects rely heavily on the actions and not the
demonstrations presented. Only a handful of studies have assessed the role of how, in a task
or skill learning context, demonstrator demographic factors might affect learning outcomes.
In one such study with vervet monkeys, Canteloup and colleagues (2020) tested individuals

28

learning outcomes on a foraging box task in response to task experts of varying kinship, sex,
age, and rank. Their results indicated that all among these factors, the only thing that seemed
predictive of transmission of the task solution was rank, such that individuals were much
more likely to learn the solution to the box from a higher-ranking individual. Thus, in this
skill-learning task, it did not appear that monkeys were using demographic factors other
than rank as markers of social expertise (Canteloup, Hoppitt, & van de Waal, 2020). In
another study, researchers tracked how young nut-cracking novice monkeys attended to the
behaviors of others (Coelho et al., 2015), and found that young capuchin monkeys choose to
observe older and more dominant others’ demonstrations. Thus at least in a skill or task
learning context, primates seem to show similarities to children in their preference for older
and more reliable demonstrators (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012; Seehagen & Herbert, 2011;
Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Elekes & Kiraly, 2012; Kachel et al., 2018; 2021).
While the studies presented above present an interesting foundation for our theories
about comparative social learning, they are limited in that of the species tested many already
demonstrate an ability to learn skills from observing others as part of their natural ecologies.
Is direct experience learning from others a pre-requisite for expertise tracking? To date, only
a couple of studies have investigated whether social species otherwise lacking these forms
of social learning, seem capable of modulating behavioral responses as a product of other
social information presented in the task. For instance, Goossens and colleagues (2008)
found that one species of macaque would more rapidly and accurately follow a gaze cue from
a human demonstrator following instances where the demonstrator made a socially relevant
facial expression (a fear grimace) as compared to when the human demonstrator did not
make a socially relevant facial expression. Related work also investigated whether monkeys
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are sensitive to the identity of the gaze cue presenter with convergent results; that is, it
seems that here too, monkeys’ behavior is flexible with respect to the social information
presented. Consistent with work in adult humans (Foulsham et al., 2010), monkeys more
readily follow the gaze of dominant, high ranking individuals as compared to the gaze of lowranking individuals (Shepherd, Deaner, and Platt, 2006).
Thus, while it is possible that social rank is a marker for social expertise in primates,
as Shepherd and colleagues point out (2006), facial dominance (i.e., the facial structure of
dominant versus subordinate individuals) is an extremely salient cue in primates
(Rosenfield et al., 2019), and a more simplistic and reflexive mechanism might provide a
sufficient explanation. To date, there have been no other comparative studies assessing how
other demographic factors might track with social expertise in a nonhuman species.
As such, comparative developmental psychology can be particularly useful for the
social learning question presented here for a few reasons. First, primates are lacking in both
their ability to teach (Gergely & Csibra, 2013; Skerry et al., 2013; Hoppitt, 2013) and the
experiential input implicated in much of the work on social learning, such as pedagogical
cues like ostension (Csibra & Gergely, 2011; Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2009; Okumura
et al., 2020) and shared intentionality (Tomsello & Carpenter, 2007; Tomasello & Rakoczy,
2003). Additionally, and despite this, primates are learning from others in complex ways,
such as through using emotional or social cues like gaze following. Even primates showing
no social learning in their natural social ecologies show the ability to differentially attend to
agents’ information (Canteloup et al., 2020; Goossens et al., 2008; Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt,
2006). Finally, human children as young as 2 and 3 (e.g., Kachen et al., 2018; Kachen et al.,
2021) are capable of making these discriminations in human demonstrators, and show a
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preference for information from older adult demonstrators instead of other children. To
what degree are these preferences shared by young primates? By testing primates across
early life and adulthood, we can test whether tracking the expertise, or age, of a
demonstrator is a unique result of human-unique experiences learning about the reliability
of different types of agents as teachers, or whether this preference is shared by other species
lacking teaching in their natural social ecology.

Macaques as a Model Species for Comparative Cognitive Development
My dissertation will explore comparative social cognitive development in one
primate genus in particular: macaques. Of the many potential subject species, the Macaca
genus is ideal for studying human cognitive evolution using the comparative developmental
perspective due to their adaptability, sociality, mirrored development, and accessibility.
After humans, macaques are the most geographically widespread primate genus (Fa &
Lindburg, 1996). Macaques thrive on the perimeters of human settlements and have adapted
to many different types of ecological conditions, from tropical climates to mountain terrain
(Fooden, 1982). Across the lifespan, macaques share many of the same life history
transitions present in humans. Though shortened and accelerated in some ways (Leigh,
2004; Bogin & Smith, 1996), macaque development is punctuated by three main biological
transitional events: weaning, sexual maturity, and senescence. These events split the
macaque lifespan into four separate periods: infancy, juvenile, adult, and old age (Rosati et
al., 2016), each unique in the social experiences and challenges an individual might face.
Macaques are highly social, living in large groups ranging from 20 to 500 members
(Fa & Lindburg, 1996). While there are many benefits to group living, the challenges that
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come from having to compete with members of your group for food, shelter, and mating
opportunities are significant. Macaques species vary in how they address the challenges that
come with group living. Macaque species vary drastically in their exhibited social tolerance
across species (Thierry, 2000; 2007), though they maintain high genetic fidelity between
species (Melnick & Kidd, 1985). Therefore, primatologists have categorized them into four
separate groups based on their exhibited social tolerance (Thierry, 2007). On one end of the
spectrum are the very tolerant Grade 4 macaques. These species, including Tonkean and
crested macaques show more reconciliatory behaviors, less kin bias in social interactions
(i.e., are more egalitarian in grooming distribution), and less aggression than macaques
falling into the Grade 1 category such as rhesus and Japanese macaques (Thierry, 2007).
Thus, the genus presents a unique opportunity to study how differential early life
experiences with varying levels of social tolerance (i.e., growing up in a highly tolerant or
highly despotic environment) affect the evolution of cognitive abilities (Thierry, Singh, &
Kaumanns, 2004; Thierry, Iwaniuk, & Pellis, 2000).

The Importance of Testing Field-Living Macaque Subjects
To date, existing work has explored the question of human-uniqueness of various
cognitive abilities by testing small captive populations in closed laboratories and zoos.
Though this work built the foundation for the field of comparative cognition, it limits the
ways that we can extrapolate the data, especially to answer the questions of comparative
cognitive development. For instance, in these settings, individuals are often housed as
singletons, in pairs, or small group housing. Thus, the social environment that captive
individuals are tested does not closely resemble that of wild or free-living primates nor does
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it match the highly social environment that humans are accustomed to. Additionally, captive
settings are sometimes limited in the demographic diversity of subjects; in other words,
subjects may be mostly one sex, or all around the same age. This, too, limits the extent to
which we can use these populations to make claims about sociocognitive development in any
particular species. An ideal testing environment would be a naturalistic population diverse
in demographic factors like age, sex, and social rank.
Fortunately, several field sites boast exactly these conditions, making them ideal
macaque populations for this research. At the Cayo Santiago Biological Field Station and
Trentham Monkey Forest, subjects are free-living in a semi-naturalistic, small island and a
botanical park respectively. From birth, individuals are able to interact with conspecifics of
varying age, sex, and rank, and can engage in activities critical to social development like
playing, grooming, and fighting. Researchers have conducted experiments with both of these
populations for decades (Kessler & Rawlins, 2016), and so I have the unique opportunity to
answer some of these open questions in comparative sociocognitive development with wellstudied populations. The work from these initial years on adult subjects lays the groundwork
for much of the research presented in my dissertation (for a review, see Drayton & Santos,
2016).

Studies Presented in the Dissertation
The three chapters presented in this dissertation use these unique free-ranging
macaque populations to investigate what I see as three central questions for comparative
developmental social psychology. The first of these chapters (Chapter 2) examines a well
identified, but perhaps poorly understood, discrepancy in human and non-human primate
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social cognition, to see whether the tools of comparative developmental psychology can help
us better understand the causal mechanisms at play. In Chapter 3, I use comparative
developmental psychology to compare two competing hypotheses about the evolution of
human cognition. Specifically, by comparing two adults of two species with very different
early life social experiences, I examine the outcome of those varying social environments on
their ability to represent what others can see. Finally, in Chapter 4, I look at another
sociocognitive ability in which human-specific early life experiences have been heavily
implicated, social expertise tracking, to look at whether primates show similar preferences
for others as sources of information.

Chapter 2: Do young monkeys know what others see?: A comparative developmental
perspective. (Arre, Clark, & Santos, 2020)
In the first empirical chapter, I examine the discrepancy in human and primate
mentalizing abilities by looking at a previously understudied area of primate social
cognition: the development of perspective taking abilities. Mental state representational
abilities like visual perspective taking make the perfect test case for this question for a couple
of reasons. First, as overviewed above, the outcome in adult humans and adult primates
differ; while humans are capable of representing many different types of mental states (e.g.,
perceptions, intentions, and beliefs), primates do not seem capable of as many mental state
representations (Drayton & Santos, 2016; Arre & Santos, in press). Thus, between humans
and rhesus macaques, we have a difference in outcome, but little understanding of how that
difference arises.
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Preliminary work in this domain to date demonstrates that some of the perspective
taking abilities present in both humans and primates show significant developmental delays
in the latter (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005; Matsuzawa, 2012; Tomonaga et al., 2012). For
instance, one of the foundational abilities implicated as a scaffold for social cognition is gaze
following, or the ability to identify and mirror the gaze of another individual. Despite the
ability being fairly early-emerging in human infants, with infants as young as three to six
months following the gaze of other agents (D’Entremont, Hains, & Muir, 1997; Butterworth
& Jarrett, 1991; Corkum & Moore, 1995), primates show significant developmental delays as
many as two to ten months later as compared to humans (Okamoto et al., 2002; Ferrari et al.,
2008; Rosati et al., 2016). This in turn, leads to significant delays in the abilities that build off
gaze following, such as geometric gaze following, or following the gaze of a conspecific to a
target that involves maneuvering around a barrier, which emerges around 12 months in
human infants (Butler, Caron, & Brooks, 2000; Caron et al., 2002) and not for 2-3 years in
young primates (Okamoto-Barth et al. 2008; Bettle & Rosati, 2019). Could this delay be part
of the explanation for differences in more complex mentalizing abilities?
To address this question, I compare the developmental timing of a perspective taking
ability in a primate species, rhesus macaques, to that in human children (Arre, Clark, &
Santos, 2020). Specifically, I look at monkeys’ ability to make a prediction about the action
of an agent when the subject monkey has been given information about the agent’s visual
perspective. In other words, how do monkey subjects expect others to act when they share
the same visual perspective? Here, I focus on monkey subjects aged from birth to sexual
maturity to investigate how closely the development of young monkeys’ mentalizing abilities
maps onto that of human children.
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Chapter 3: Macaques with varying social tolerance show no differences in
understanding what others perceive (Arre, Stumph, & Santos, 2021)
In my second empirical chapter, I explore the role that the socioecological
environment plays in sociocognitive development. Specifically, two theories propose
conflicting accounts for how human cognition came to be. The Machiavellian Intelligence
hypothesis proposes that human social cognition is the result of experience competing for
resources and exploiting the perspective, knowledge, and beliefs of other agents in our large
social groups. Alternatively, the Survival of the Friendliest hypothesis proposes that in fact
it is our propensity to work together and cooperate that drives our sophisticated social
cognition. Both hypotheses make specific predictions about the use of social cues such as
gaze following and visual perspective taking, mainly, that experience exploiting or aligning
with others’ perspective is the root of all other social interactions.
Thus, macaques present a perfect test case for examining whether competitive or
cooperative environments better elicit more human-like perspective taking abilities, as they
exhibit a natural broad spectrum of social tolerance across species. Specifically, by testing
adult macaques on both ends of the tolerance spectrum, I can examine what types of
developmental experiences in early life are more suited to elicit human-like visual
perspective taking abilities in adulthood. To investigate this, I compare adults in two species
varying in the degree of their social tolerance, rhesus and Barbary macaques, on their
perspective taking abilities (Arre, Stumph, & Santos, 2021) to better understand the social
conditions and experiences that are more likely to elicit human-like social cognition.
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Chapter 4: Do monkeys attend to age when gaze following? (Arre, Stumph, Hengartner,
& Santos, in prep)
To date, the existing primate literature on social learning has focused on non-social
puzzle box tasks to investigate questions on nonhuman animal social learning abilities,
despite much of a primate’s natural ecology being largely social in nature. To address this
omission, in the final empirical chapter, I have devised a task that exploits a natural social
behavior in monkeys, gaze following, to whether primates show human children like
preferences for older, expert agents (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012; Seehagen & Herbert,
2011; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Elekes & Kiraly, 2012; Kachel et al., 2018; 2021) in a naturalistic
task. I will test rhesus macaques, which are highly social (Rawlins & Kessler, 1986), face
many of the same social challenges as humans, and show human-like facial perception (Dahl
et al., 2009; Rosenfeld & Van Hoesen, 1979) and perspective taking abilities (Drayton &
Santos, 2016). Critically, rhesus macaques show no evidence for direct teaching or social
learning (Whiten & van de Waal, 2017), and shared a relatively recent evolutionary ancestor
with humans (Kumar & Hedges, 1998). As such, they make an ideal candidate to investigate
whether primates lacking in teaching as part of their natural ecology still show elements of
human-like social learning such as expertise tracking. By designing a task tapping into a
naturally occurring behavior, I hope to better assess development of sociocognitive abilities
in this social species.
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Chapter 2: Do young rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) know what others see?: A
comparative developmental perspective
Arre, A.M., Clark, C.S., & Santos, L.R. (2020). American Journal of Primatology, 82(11),
e23054.

Humans undergo robust ontogenetic shifts in theory of mind capabilities. Are these
developmental changes unique to human development or are they shared with other closely
related non-human species? To explore this question, we tested the development of theory
of mind capacities in a population of 236 infant and juvenile rhesus macaques (Macaca
mulatta). Using a looking-time method, we examined what developing monkeys know about
others’ perceptions. Specifically, we tested whether younger monkeys predict that a person
will reach for an object where she last saw it. Overall, we found a significant interaction
between a monkey’s age and performance on this task (p = 0.014). Juvenile monkeys
(between two and five years of age) show a trend towards human infant-like patterns of
performance, looking longer during the unexpected condition as compared to the expected
condition, though this difference is nonsignificant (p = 0.09). However, contrary to findings
in human infants, infant rhesus macaques show a different trend. Infant monkeys on average
look slightly longer on average during the expected condition than the unexpected condition,
though this pattern was not significant (p = 0.06). Our developmental results in monkeys
provide some hints about the development of theory of mind capacities in non-humans. First,
young rhesus macaques appear to show some interest in the perception of other agents.
Second, young rhesus seem able to make predictions based on the visual perspective of
another agent, though the developmental pattern of this ability is not as clear nor robust as
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in humans. As such, while an understanding of others’ perceptions is early emerging in
human infants, it may require more experience interacting with other social agents in our
nonhuman relatives.
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As we navigate our social world, we readily ascribe intentions, perceptions, desires, and
knowledge to other beings. Unsurprisingly to those of us studying nonhuman primates
(hereafter, primates), humans are not alone in these abilities. Indeed, many of our closest
relatives share the capacity to reason about others’ mental experiences (for a review see
Rosati, Santos, & Hare, 2010). Nevertheless, the degree to which primates represent others’
mental experiences is largely a point of contention, as decades of research suggest that
primates may not be quite as sophisticated in their mentalizing abilities as humans
(Herrmann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007; Martin & Santos, 2016; Call
& Tomasello, 2008). As such, research into the nuances of primates’ reasoning about other
agents is important for improving our understanding of how exactly primates perceive the
perceptual and mental states of others.
While adult humans exhibit fairly stable theory of mind abilities, human infants and
children undergo rich developmental transitions in their theory of mind abilities (Wellman,
Fang, & Peterson 2011; Wellman & Liu 2004). Almost from birth, infants show a proclivity
for making eye contact with other agents (Haith, Bergman, & Moore 1977) that likely
provides an important scaffold for later developing theory of mind abilities. Later on in
development, human children begin to show more sophisticated perspective taking
capacities, and these abilities typically emerge in a fairly robust order (Wellman & Liu 2004),
especially when tested using traditional verbal tasks. Young infants begin representing the
desires of other agents (Wellman and Wooley, 1990), and then afterwards begin to represent
others’ beliefs (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Luo & Johnson, 2009; Wellman et al., 2001;
Wimmer & Perner, 1983; but see Powell et al., 2017), knowledge and ignorance states
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(Perner, 1995; Perner, 2000), and finally, emotional states (Harris et al., 1989; Wellman &
Liu, 2004). Lastly, and not typically until late adolescence, do we see more sophisticated
reasoning about other agents’ linguistic intentions, including nuances such as metaphor
usage and irony (Happé, 1994).
Some of the most famous evidence for sophisticated theory of mind like abilities is in
human infants at fifteen months of age (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). In the “true belief”
condition, both the infant subject and the presenter watched as an object was hidden in one
of two locations. Critically, during the test trial, the subjects then watched as the presenter
reached into the location where both she and the participant watched the object hidden, or
the opposite empty location. If infants are able to take the visual perspective of the presenter
and use this perspective to form expectations for how other agents should act, then they
should look longer when the presenter does the unexpected thing and reaches into the empty
box. Indeed, Onishi and Baillargeon found that infants do look longer when another agent
does the unexpected thing and acts inconsistently with her visual perspective. This is in
contrast to the condition where the presenter acts consistently with her visual perspective
(the expected condition). This task has been adapted and replicated in a number of different
subjects, and in subjects as young as 10 months of age (Luo & Baillargeon, 2007; Luo, 2011).
These more recent results, and the original findings from Onishi and Baillargeon, imply that
visual perspective taking is an emerging ability in humans that requires relatively little input
and experience.
Here, we use a nearly identical task to examine the developmental origins of a similar
visual perspective taking ability in one non-human primate species: the rhesus macaque
(Macaca mulatta). Rhesus macaques are one of the most well studied primate species in the
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domain of social cognition (Drayton & Santos, 2014; Rosati, Santos, & Hare, 2010; Call &
Tomasello, 2008; Platt, Seyfarth, and Cheney, 2016; Chang et al., 2013). The rhesus macaque
is a species of Old-World monkey that makes a good candidate for studying the origins of
visual perspective taking for a couple of reasons. First, because of this species’ complicated
social structure, we can test what aspects of complex sociality is enough to scaffold the
emergence of some of these sociocognitive abilities. Rhesus macaques exhibit a linear
dominance hierarchy, whereby individuals must compete for resources including water and
food, but also social activity such as grooming and mating opportunities (Maestripieri &
Hoffman, 2012). One might expect that a prerequisite to succeeding in such a despotic social
environment would be sophisticated social cognition. For nearly two decades, scientists have
been studying exactly this question – specifically what theory of mind abilities adult rhesus
macaques possess (for a review, see Drayton & Santos, 2014; Marin & Santos, 2016).
To date, available evidence suggests that adults of this species are able to take the visual
perspective of other agents and to use this information when deciding whom to steal from
(Flombaum & Santos, 2005). More recent work from the same population has demonstrated
that adult rhesus monkeys can flexibly use the visual perspective of another agent,
habituating across repeated uninformative gaze cues (Rosati et al., 2016; Bettle & Rosati,
2019), forming expectations about how other agents should act based on these perspectives
(Marticorena et al., 2011), and representing visual perspectives to make inferences about
behavior when the other agent is knowledgeable or ignorant (Drayton & Santos, 2017;
Drayton & Santos 2018; Horschler, Santos, & MacLean, 2019). There is less evidence,
however, that this species can represent others’ false beliefs (Marticorena et al., 2011; Martin
& Santos, 2014).
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Despite the abundance of work testing theory of mind abilities in adult rhesus monkeys,
we actually know very little about social cognition changes in younger individuals of this
species. However, these types of comparative developmental studies are important for
informing critical theories in human development, specifically those theories outlining what
kinds of experiences are necessary for the emergence of certain sociocognitive abilities
(Rosati et al., 2014; Tomasello, 2019). While adult primates share with humans a complex
social structure, and frequent engagement and observance of social interactions, they lack
some social behaviors implicated in early human social development such as false belief
representational abilities (Marticorena et al., 2011; but see Krupenye et al., 2016).
To fill this gap, here we studied the development of visual perspective taking in young
rhesus macaques. Specifically, we tested 236 infant and juvenile rhesus macaques on a task
assessing visual perspective taking that had previously been validated both with human
infants (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005) and adult macaques of this exact population
(Marticorena et al., 2011).
Very few studies of non-human cognitive development have been conducted on such a
large scale, though two (Rosati et al., 2016; Rosati et al., 2018) existing studies have tested
social cognitive development in macaques from this same population. In one such study
(Rosati et al., 2016), researchers investigated the developmental trajectory of gaze following,
or the ability to co-orient with another individual. They found that despite different early
socioecology, rhesus macaque gaze-following abilities followed a human-like, but
developmentally delayed trajectory. For young rhesus macaques, this means some gaze
following in early infancy (under 1 year of age), with the ability ramping up during the
juvenile period (between 2 and 5 years of age). However, it appears that primate subjects do
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not appropriately use gaze cues until adulthood, as infants are slow to habituate even in the
absence of a potential target as compared to adult, and even juvenile subjects. While other
studies have investigated the development of cognitive abilities in macaques as compared to
humans (Almeling et al., 2016; Ferrari et al., 2006; Ferrari et al., 2009; Simpson et al., 2016;
Weed, Bryant, & Perry, 2008; Natale & Spinozzi, 1988; Ferrari et al., 2000) these two studies
are of particular relevance in part due to their large sample size and coverage across the
entire primate lifespan as opposed to focus on a single age class.
Based on this very small body of literature assessing the lifelong development of different
cognitive abilities in rhesus macaques, we anticipated that rhesus monkeys would show a
similar, but delayed, developmental trajectory as human children. Specifically, we expected
we would see limited or no evidence of visual perspective taking in infant rhesus macaques
(< 1 year of age), with the ability stabilizing throughout the juvenile period (between 1 and
5 years of age).

Methods
Subjects. We tested infant and juvenile rhesus macaques from the Cayo Santiago
Biological Field Station population (Rawlins & Kessler, 1986), a small research site on an
island off the east coast of Puerto Rico. The field site has been in operation since 1938, and
is home to over 1500 free-ranging macaques. At one year of age, each monkey in this
population receives a unique ID, which is tattooed on the monkey’s chest and inner right
thigh. Additionally, the monkeys on the island are diverse in sex, age, and social rank makeup, making them an ideal population to study comparative development.
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All individuals on the island under the age of five years (60 months) were eligible for the
study. Monkeys younger than one year of age were not yet tattooed, and thus were identified
by their mother’s ID. Infant and juvenile monkeys could be tested alone or clinging ventrally
to a calmly sitting mother. In either event, we required a nursing event in order to properly
identify the infant subject. Once a nursing incident was observed between the subject and
the mother, the sex of the individual was confirmed by the matriline data provided by our
census team. If subjects could not be properly identified, they were excluded (for a more
detailed account of exclusions, see the Exclusions subsection below). The birthdates of each
individual were taken from the matriline database developed by the Cayo Santiago census
team and are estimated to have an error window of one to three days.
Between January and July 2017, we successfully tested 236 young rhesus macaques,
(infant n = 75; juvenile n = 161). The age cohorts are illustrated in Table 1. Age distribution
across the two conditions is illustrated in Figure 1.

Apparatus. In the experiment, we presented monkeys a set of stimuli or events taking
place on a stage built from foamcore [Figure 2]. The box was 30” long and 10” deep. On the
front of the stage was a large screen (24” tall), which we used to occlude the entire display
from the view of the subject. The back of the stage was 22”, approximately chest height of
the presenter when she was kneeling. On either side of the stage was a small box (6” x 6” x
6”). The two boxes were different colors (blue and orange) to individuate them, and the inner
side of each box was left open but trimmed with fake leaves. This allowed for the moving
object (a plastic lemon) to enter and exit the two boxes, but prevented the subject from
seeing the content of the box. We cut through the center of the stage to create a track, which
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allowed the lemon to move between the two boxes. A handle attached to the lemon beneath
the stage allowed the experimenter to surreptitiously manipulate the movement of the
lemon, out of view of the subject.

Procedure. The experimental procedure was identical to a previous study testing adult
macaques from the same population (see Experiment 1 in Marticorena et al., 2011). Two
experimenters ran each session. To begin a session, both experimenters approached a calmly
sitting monkey. The presenter (E1) would kneel roughly one to three meters away and place
the apparatus between herself and the subject monkey. The cameraperson (E2) would then
stand over or kneel beside E1 and begin filming the subject. At the start of each trial, E1
would set the apparatus stage and then call ‘now’ as she dropped the occluder. At this cue,
E2 would begin timing. After ten seconds, E2 would call ‘stop’. Each study session consisted
of three 10-second trials: two familiarization trials and one test trial (for a detailed
illustration, see Figure 2.).
In the first familiarization trial (familiarization to the action), monkeys watched as the
occluder dropped and the experimenter reached into one of the two boxes, and then held
that position for the duration of the trial (10 seconds). In the second familiarization trial
(familiarization to the object), the occluder dropped and the experimenter looked down at
the object, a lemon, for the duration of the trial. In the final trial, the test trial, the occluder
dropped and the stage was empty, with the lemon inside in the blue box. Depending on the
condition, the lemon either moved out of and into that same blue box, or the lemon crossed
the stage and went into the opposite orange box. If subject monkeys tracked the visual
perspective of the presenter and expected her to act consistently with her visual perspective,
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then they should expect E1 to reach into the box she just watched the lemon go into. To test
this, we presented monkeys with either a test trial in which E1 reached into the box holding
the lemon (expected test condition) or one in which E1 reached into the box that was empty
(unexpected test condition). In both conditions, the experimenter held the reaching position
for the duration of the trial. We counterbalanced both the reach in trial one, and the box that
the lemon was hidden in in the test trial, across subjects, such that in total there were four
counterbalanced conditions, two with expected outcomes and two with unexpected
outcomes.

Exclusions. To count as a successful session, we required that subject monkeys complete
all three 10-second trials. In total we successfully tested 236 monkeys. We also approached
another 139 monkeys that did not successfully complete the session because the subject
monkey approached the box (3), was interfered with or displaced by another monkey, most
commonly its mother (10), stopped attending to the stimuli (7), walked away (33), had seen
the entire study at an earlier date (41), or were never correctly identified (1). An additional
44 more sessions were excluded immediately after collection due to presenter error. During
three sequential days of data collection (3 June 2017 through 6 June 2017) we determined
that E1 was presenting the incorrect order of stimuli to the subjects such that the conditions
did not match those originally presented during the initial data collection session (3 January
2017 through 15 January 2017). To ensure consistency across data collection trips, we
excluded all successful sessions collected during this three-day period (44 sessions). All
subject monkeys tested during this time were also ineligible for testing in the subsequent
days of data collection. The decision to exclude the sessions from these dates was made the
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day the error was discovered, 6 June 2017, prior to data clipping, coding, or analysis. Even
with this error, the study had about a 65.5% success rate, which is consistent with other
cognitive studies carried out on Cayo Santiago (Marticorena et al., 2011; Martin & Santos,
2014; Horschler, MacLean, & Santos, 2019; Drayton & Santos, 2017; Drayton & Santos, 2018)

Data analysis. Experimental trials were then clipped so that they could be coded blind
to condition; we removed all identifying information (including subject ID, trial number,
condition, and session type) from each clip and gave each a randomized identifying code.
Two independent experimenters each coded all of the clips for subject looking time towards
the entire experimental setup during each frame. Inter-observer reliability was high
(Pearson’s R = 0.92), which is consistent with other studies from this field site (Marticorena
et al., 2011; Drayton & Santos, 2017; Rosati et al., 2018; Horschler, MacLean, & Santos, 2019).
Data from the first coder was used for the purpose of the data analysis, though the results
are the same regardless of data used. All analyses were done using RStudio statistical
software, Version 1.0.153 (R Core Team, 2013).

Data Availability Statement. The data (Arre, Clark, & Santos, 2019) that support the
findings of this study are openly available in the Open Science Framework data repository at
https://osf.io/76439/?view_only=cf6cef3b7c9e40679c61e8403d4f4c0f,

reference

DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/76439.

IACUC Approval and Ethics Statement. All research protocols reported in this manuscript
were reviewed and approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of Yale
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University (IACUC Protocol # 2014-11624) and the University of Puerto Rico (Protocol
#8310106). The research presented in this manuscript adhered to the American Society of
Primatologists (ASP) Principles for the Ethical Treatment of Non-Human Primates and the
legal requirements of Puerto Rico.

Results
Since we predicted that we might see different looking patterns in the critical test trial as
a function of age, we first ran a two-way ANOVA on the sample (n = 236) to examine the
effect of age cohort and condition on the subject monkeys’ looking time. We found a weak
but significant interaction in monkeys’ patterns of looking between conditions as a function
of their age cohort (F(1,232) = 6.08, p= 0.014, ηp² = 0.05; Fig. 3). We then looked at simple
main effects of condition on subjects of each age cohort’s looking time using an independent
samples t-test. Infants (less than 1 year of age; n = 75) looked longer in the expected
condition (M = 5.00 s, SD = 2.49 s) as compared to the unexpected (M = 3.98 s, SD = 2.13 s)
condition, though this trend was not statistically significant (t(73) = 1.91, p = 0.06, d = 0.440).
In contrast, juvenile monkeys (between 1 and 5 years of age; n = 161) looked longer in the
unexpected condition (M = 4.49 s, SD = 2.63 s) than the expected (M = 3.86 s, SD = 2.23 s)
condition, though again this trend was not significant (t(159) = -1.66, p = 0.09, d = 0.261).
Note that while these two different trends were not significant with each age cohort (infants:
p = 0.06; juveniles: p = 0.09), the emerging pattern for the two age categories is significantly
different (p = 0.014). Put simply, juvenile monkeys showed a trend toward a more adult-like
pattern (Marticorena et al. 2011) in their looking behavior, and looked on average longer
when the presenter reached inconsistently with her visual perspective (unexpected
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condition) than when she acted accordingly with her visual perspective (expected
condition). Infant monkeys showed the reverse trend, looking longer when the presenter
reached consistently with her visual perspective as compared to when she acted
inconsistently with her visual perspective.
To be sure that monkeys assigned to the inconsistent reach condition were not looking
longer across the entire study session, we also confirmed that the looking during the
familiarization trials was functionally the same between conditions within each cohort.
Using Welch’s t-tests, overall we found no significant differences between conditions in the
familiarization trials. In the first familiarization trial, we found no significant difference in
average looking time between condition for the infants (t(72.09) = 1.34, p = 0.18) who
watched equally in the expected (M = 5.07 s, SD = 2.64 s) versus the unexpected (M = 4.29 s,
SD = 2.42 s) conditions, nor in the juveniles (t(155.89) = 0.21, p = 0.83) who also watched
equally in the expected (M = 5.05 s, SD = 2.37 s) and unexpected (M = 4.97 s, SD = 2.08 s)
conditions. The same was true in the second familiarization trial for juveniles (t(156.33) = p
= 0.67); expected condition (M = 4.83, SD = 2.31 s), unexpected condition (M = 4.97 s, SD =
2.63 s), and while the infants show a trend to look slightly longer in the expected condition
(M = 5.79 s, SD = 2.63 s), as compared to the unexpected condition (M = 4.70 s, SD = 2.52),
the difference is non-significant (t(72.65) = 1.83, p = 0.070). Given that the looking time did
not differ significantly between the two conditions in either of the first two familiarization
trials, we concluded that any differences observed in the test trial reflects actual differences
in attention between conditions and not artifacts of more general age-based differences in
subject attention.
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Finally, to exclude the possibility that differences we observed in the test trial were the
result of subject population differences between conditions, we conducted an F-test to check
for equal age variance between the two populations. There was no significant difference in
age variance between condition [F1,
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= 0.99784, p = 0.9911), so a differential age

distribution across the two conditions is not likely driving the looking time differences
between conditions.

Discussion
Do young monkeys know what others can see? Here, we present preliminary evidence
that younger juvenile rhesus macaques may be able represent the visual perspective of other
agents and form expectations based on these perspective representations. We saw a nonsignificant trend in which juvenile rhesus macaques looked slightly longer when the
experimenter acts inconsistently with her visual perspective (unexpected condition),
reaching into the empty box, instead of reaching towards the box where she just watched the
lemon disappear (expected condition). Note that this trend is similar to the pattern that adult
rhesus macaques (Marticorena et al., 2011) and human infants (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005)
show more robustly. If the trend we observed in juvenile macaques holds up when larger
samples are tested, then it is possible that that rhesus juveniles can indeed track the visual
perspective of another agent and form expectations about how an agent will act based on
that perspective-taking.
Does this adult-like pattern of performance extend to rhesus infants? Interestingly, the
answer here seems to be no. We found that a monkeys’ pattern of looking depends largely
on its age; indeed, we found significantly different looking patterns in the critical test trial
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across our two age cohorts. In contrast to the pattern we observed in juveniles, infant rhesus
macaques trend towards looking longer when the agent acted in a consistent way (expected
condition), reaching towards the location of a hidden object, as compared to the inconsistent
behavior (or unexpected condition), when she reached towards the box that both she and
the subject knew was empty. This pattern, though non-significant (p = 0.06) is the opposite
of what is observed in human infants and adult rhesus macaques, both of whom look longer
in the unexpected condition, when the presenter acts inconsistently with her visual
perspective. Our data therefore hint that infant rhesus macaques (under 1 year of age) may
be unable to form accurate expectations based on the visual perspective of another agent.
That said, it’s worth noting that though we found a significant difference between our two
age cohorts, the pattern we observed within each age cohort was not statistically significant.
For this reason, the trends we observed within each group should be considered with
caution.
Assuming these results hold when larger within-age samples are tested, there are a
number of possible explanations for significant developmental change we seem to have
observed. One possibility is that monkeys’ development of visual perspective taking shows
a human-like pattern, but young monkeys are delayed in their ability to make inferences
about how another agent will act based on this visual perspective representation. This
parallel, but delayed, developmental pattern of visual perspective taking in macaques
relative to humans would be consistent with what has been observed in other sociocognitive
domains. Specifically, this pattern mirrors the developmental pattern of gaze following
(Rosati et al., 2016), an ability often implicated as a foundational ability required for
scaffolding more sophisticated mentalizing skills (Wellman, 2011; Shepherd, 2010).
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While gaze following and perspective taking in human infants are present from an
extremely young age, the emergence of these abilities in primates appears delayed. Taken
together, the trending results presented here, and those from prior work (Rosati et al., 2016),
suggest that young rhesus macaques may require more experience in order for their
sociocognitive abilities to come online. What types of experiences specifically might help
scaffold these early-emerging perspective taking abilities? Tomasello and colleagues have
argued that early human infant engagement in joint attentional activities with other social
agents is one activity that may help young infants develop their perspective taking abilities
(Carpenter et al., 1998; Tomasello, 1995). However, we know that most nonhuman primates
do not engage in joint attention in the same way as humans (Tomasello et al., 2005). Another
possibility, then, is that more input of other types of social experiences, like watching other
agents act on their visual perspectives, might be necessary in order for infants to make these
predictions themselves. Future work will need to investigate the precise early experiences
required for young macaque social cognition.
A different alternative, though, is that the flipped trend of looking we see in infant rhesus
macaques is indicative not of a developmental delay, but instead of a neophobic response. A
condition in which the presenter acts consistently with her visual perspective may be a more
familiar behavior to infants, and thus may be a more preferable gaze target for infant rhesus
macaques. Indeed, this pattern of looking longer at the consistent condition is reminiscent of
some of the developmental results in human infants (for a review see Hunter & Ames, 1988;
Houston-Price & Nakai, 2004). Specifically, human infants sometimes show preferential
looking to the familiar or expected condition rather than the novel or unexpected condition
in a variety of domains. Several researchers have posited that this preferential looking
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towards the expected condition in looking-time studies may be an artifact of a more domaingeneral aversion to novel events and stimuli, or neophobia, which human infants show
around this age (e.g., Hunter & Ames 1988). However, it’s again worth noting that the
difference we observed in infant macaque looking across conditions was non-significant (p
= 0.06), and thus we should be cautious in interpreting this pattern of performance too
strongly.
Taken together, this first test of nonhuman primate visual perspective-taking
development shows that infant and juvenile rhesus macaques seem to undergo a
developmental transition. This transition takes place some time around their first and
second year of age as infants are weaning and gaining independence from their mothers. We
found a significant interaction in looking time patterns between the two cohorts, where
juvenile rhesus monkeys showed a trend toward more adult-like pattern of looking longer
at the unexpected condition, while infant rhesus showed the opposite trend. To further
understand this pattern, future work should test larger within-age cohorts in order to gain
the statistical power needed to determine whether these trends reflect the real patterns
shown by these age groups. Moreover, future work should also attempt to tease apart the
types of experiences required for these sociocognitive abilities to emerge, investigating
behavioral differences around the weaning transition (1 year of age), to see how infant
macaques around that age are changing in their independence, social interactions, and
observations of other social agents.
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Age cohort

Infants

Juveniles

Age (months)

0 – 12

12 – 60

Life

span

event Birth to weaning age

markers

age

to

sexual

maturity

Sample size (n)
Looking
expected
(seconds)

Weaning

75

161

time
in 5.00
condition

3.86

Looking
time
in 3.98
unexpected condition
(seconds)

4.49

Table 1. Subject age cohort distribution and study results. Note that these cohorts reflect the
nomenclature used in the previous cognitive developmental literature on this population
(Rosati et al., 2016).
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Figure 1. Histograms of the subject age distribution (in months) split by session condition.
There was no significant difference in overall age variance between the two conditions.
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Figure 2. Demo photos of each trial type. (a) Trial 1: Familiarization to action; (b) Trial 2:
Familiarization to object and (c-1-6) Trial 3: Test Trial: the subject and presenter watch as
the lemon exits the blue box and either (c-1) returns to the blue box or (c-2) crosses the stage
and enters the orange box. The presenter then either acts consistently with her visual
perspective, (c-3, c-4) reaching the box which she and the subject just watched the lemon
disappear into (the expected condition) or acts inconsistently with her visual perspective,
(c-5, c-6) reaching into the box opposite of the lemon (the unexpected condition).
68

Figure 3. While a two-way ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between cohort and
condition [F(1, 232) = 6.082, p = 0.014, ηp² = 0.05], the looking-time between conditions
within each cohort [infants (p = 0.06) and juveniles (p = 0.09)] did not differ significantly.
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Chapter 3: Macaque species with varying social tolerance show no differences in
understanding what other agents perceive
Arre, A.M., Stumph, E., & Santos, L.R. (in press). Animal Cognition.
A growing body of work demonstrates that a species’ socioecology can impact its
cognitive abilities. Indeed, even closely related species with different socioecological
pressures often show different patterns of cognitive performance on the same task. Here, we
explore whether major differences in social tolerance in two closely related macaque species
can impact a core sociocognitive ability, the capacity to recognize what others see.
Specifically, we compared the performance of Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus, n = 80)
and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta, n = 62) on a standard test of visual perspective
understanding. In contrast to the difference in performance one might expect from these
species’ divergent socioecologies, our results show similar performance across Barbary and
rhesus macaques, with both species forming expectations about how another agent will act
based on that agent’s visual perspective. These results suggest that differences in
socioecology may not play as big of a role in the evolution of some theory of mind capacities
as they do in other decision-making or foraging contexts.
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Introduction
In recent decades, comparative psychology research suggests that species’ social and
physical environments shape their cognitive capacities. Indeed, social and ecological
differences can drive robust cognitive differences in otherwise very closely related species
(for a review see MacLean et al. 2012). These types of ecologically-based cognitive
differences are especially salient in nonhuman primates (hereafter, primates), where
researchers have uncovered a number of domains in which primates develop cognitive
abilities that align with the specific problems they naturally face in their own ecological
niches (Rosati 2017; e.g. chimpanzees and bonobos in Wrangham & Pilbeam 2001).
Most of the species-specific differences in cognition observed to date have been cases
of non-social cognitive abilities that vary across species with divergent feeding ecology.
Foraging primates vary in the extent to which they need to wait to obtain their food sources
(e.g., time-intensive gummivorous foraging versus herbivorous or insectivorous foraging
with immediately-consumable rewards), engage in safe or risk-taking behavior (e.g. hunting
live prey versus foraging plants), and navigate complex environments (e.g. a dense forest
versus an open savannah). Thus, one might expect that species with varying diets would
show differences in a set of relevant cognitive skills, such as temporal discounting, risktaking, and spatial navigation. Indeed, researchers have observed that feeding ecology seems
to play a role in the evolution of a variety of such cognitive abilities. For instance, species that
have to wait or work for their food in the wild show similar patterns in an experimental
cognitive task, waiting significantly longer for a better reward in tests of temporal
discounting as compared to closely related species that eat foods with a more immediate
payoff (Stevens, Hallinan, & Hauser, 2005; Rosati & Hare, 2013). Researchers have observed
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the same pattern of results in the domain of risk preferences, where species that experience
more risk as part of their natural diet similarly show a preference for more risky options in
an experimental setup than closely related species that feed on more abundant resources
(Heilbronner et al., 2008; Rosati & Hare, 2012a). Similarly, others have found that spatial
cognitive capacities can be shaped by species’ specific ecological differences, such as the
degree to which their main food source is abundantly distributed in their environments.
Species who forage on fruit and other sparsely available foods face a harder spatial
navigation challenge than species that consume abundantly available leaves (Rosati, 2017),
and consequently show better spatial navigation and memory abilities than those species
whose diet is abundantly distributed (Rosati et al., 2014; Rosati & Hare, 2012b).
Taken together, this work shows that a species’ natural foraging ecology matters a lot
for the evolution of its nonsocial cognitive abilities. Nevertheless, foraging problems are not
the only factor at play in a species’ natural ecology. While early comparative work focused
mostly on the role that diet and foraging ecology played in species differences in cognitive
abilities, more recent work has begun to explore how differences in the social environment
can shape a species’ cognition. Researchers have long suspected, for example, that a species’
group size might influence its sociocognitive abilities (Dunbar 1998). The so-called social
brain hypothesis was originally developed as an explanation for the tendency of brain size
to scale as a function of group size, especially in primate species (Shultz and Dunbar 2007;
Dunbar and Shultz 2007a; Dunbar and Shultz 2007b). Due to increased pressure and
experience to overcome social challenges like intra- and intergroup conflicts and cooperative
breeding, and similar demands that come with living in large complex social groups, some
have argued that species living in big groups should show superior social cognition to small
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group or individualistic living species (Dunbar 2009; Shultz and Dunbar 2007; Dunbar and
Shultz 2007a; Dunbar and Shultz 2007b). MacLean and colleagues (2013) were among the
first to test this directly, exploring whether group size affected lemurs’ ability to recognize
what others see. They compared five lemur species on a visual perspective taking test in
which subjects have the opportunity to steal food from human experimenters who can and
can’t see them (see Flombaum & Santos 2005; Hare et al. 2000 for a similar task). They found
that species with larger group sizes performed better on the competitive stealing task as
compared to those species with smaller group sizes. However, they found no relationship
between group size and task performance in a non-social task (MacLean et al. 2013). Group
size has such a powerful influence on social cognition that lemur species with larger group
sizes (e.g., ring-tailed lemurs, Lemur catta) perform more similarly to monkeys on this and
other social tasks than to other species of lemurs (Sandel, MacLean, & Hare 2011; Jolly 1966).
Another aspect of a species’ social environment that is thought to affect cognition
concerns a species’ social tolerance. Some species are more despotic, characterized by their
high and unbalanced rates of aggresttion, low rates of reconciliation, kinship bias for
affiliative interactions than other more tolerant species (Aureli et al. 1997; Thierry 1985). A
number of accounts of human cognitive evolution hint that such differences in tolerance may
be important for the evolution of complex social cognitive abilities (e.g. Hare, Wobber, &
Wrangham, 2012; Cieri et al., 2014) like cumulative culture, social learning, and language
(Sánchez-Villagra & van Schaik, 2019; Thomas & Kirby, 2018; Benítez-Burraco & Progovac,
2020). For example, some scholars have argued that more despotic, competitive social
environments could lead to the evolution of richer social cognitive skills (Byrne & Whiten
1990; Byrne 1994; Byrne 1996). This account— which has been christened the
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Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis— would predict that more despotic and competitive
social environments could serve as a catalyst for developing more sophisticated
sociocognitive skills (Humphrey 1976; de Waal 2007; Byrne & Whiten 1990). Conversely,
others have argued for the opposite view, claiming that sophisticated social cognition results
from environments in which cooperation is promoted (Hare, Wobber, & Wrangham, 2012;
Hare, 2017), a view that some have called the “self domestication” or “survival of the
friendliest” account (e.g., Hare & Woods 2020). For this reason, scholars have begun
exploring whether species differences in social tolerance map onto differences in cognitive
abilities across closely related species.
A growing body of work hints that tolerance differences at the species level may give
rise to a number of species differences in social cognitive capacities. Most of this work comes
from our closest living relatives, chimpanzees and bonobos. For example, though closely
related, bonobos and chimpanzees show different levels of tolerance both within and
between social groups, with chimpanzees exhibiting much less tolerance and reconciliation
than bonobos (Wrangham & Pilbeam 2001; but see Jaeggi, Stevens, and van Schaik 2010).
Bonobos show a stronger preference to look at social stimuli like faces and eyes than
chimpanzees (Kano, Hirata, & Call 2015), gaining more experience from a younger age at
reading and interpreting the social cues of other agents like gaze direction and facial
expression, as compared to chimpanzees. Bonobos also show more prosocial preferences
than chimpanzees across the lifespan, with bonobos showing more willingness to share food
in adulthood (Hare & Kwetuenda 2010) than chimpanzees, which only exhibit food sharing
in early life (Silk et al. 2005; Jensen et al. 2006). This switch towards intolerance in
chimpanzees seems to emerge early in chimpanzee development (Wobber, Wrangham, &
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Hare 2010) suggesting that the species differences observed in adults result from speciesspecific developmental changes.
A limited body of work has investigated the same question in non-ape primate species. For
example, Joly and colleagues (2017) compared several aspects of social and nonsocial
cognition in four macaque species. The macaque genus shows a clear linear spectrum from
more tolerant to more despotic species (Thierry 2007; Thierry, Singh, & Kaumanns 2004;
Thierry, Iwaniuk, Pellis 2000), making this genus particularly useful for testing predictions
about how social tolerance shapes cognition. Joly and colleagues (2017) found that the
different species showed similar levels of performance on non-social tests of causality,
numerical reasoning, and spatial memory, but did exhibit performance differences on at least
some tests of social cognition. For example, the different macaque species performed
differently on a social object choice task, in which subjects had to follow an experimenter’s
pointing cue towards different hiding locations to receive a food reward. Tolerant species
were more likely to succeed at the task, as compared to less tolerant species, which the
authors argued showed that tolerant species have better social cognition as compared to
despotic species; interestingly, however, the tolerant and despotic species showed no
differences in performance in the other tasks assessing social cognition.
In another experiment, Rosati and Santos (2017) found a difference in one social
cognitive ability between tolerant and intolerant species, but only when evaluating
developmental differences. In their experiment, they compared gaze following rates across
the lifespan in tolerant Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus) to that of despotic rhesus
macaques (Macaca mulatta). Adults in both species do not seem to differ in their propensity
to gaze follow. However, their findings show an important developmental difference
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between the two species; rhesus monkeys show marked decline in the degree of gaze
following across the lifespan, while Barbary macaques maintain juvenile levels into late
adulthood. This pattern across macaques is mirrored in chimpanzees and bonobos, whose
gaze following patterns mirror those found in macaques (Herrmann et al. 2010), with more
tolerant bonobos outperforming chimpanzees on tasks requiring gaze following and more
complex social skills, but not on tasks assessing physical and causal skills.
Building off this work and to further explore the extent to which tolerance shapes
complex social cognition abilities, we compared whether two species of macaques that vary
in their social tolerance (see Thierry 2007; Thierry, Singh, & Kaumanns 2004; Thierry,
Iwaniuk, Pellis 2000) also vary in their capacity to understand another agents’ visual
perspective (Marticorena et al. 2011). We chose to compare the performance of Barbary
macaques and rhesus macaques because these two macaque species are on either end of the
tolerance spectrum. Rhesus macaques have lower levels of social tolerance and social life is
characterized by more hierarchical steepness, more violent inter- and intragroup
encounters, and even more sophisticated facial expressions indicating submission (Thierry,
Iwaniuk, & Pellis 2004) than species like Barbary macaques (Matsumura, 1999). Visual
perspective taking is the ideal cognitive ability to study this difference due to the two
competing hypotheses about the effect of social tolerance on social cognition evolution.
Specifically, the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis (Humphrey, 1976; de Waal, 2007;
Byrne & Whiten 1990) and the Self-Domestication Hypothesis (Hare, Wobber, & Wrangham,
2012; Hare, 2017) each make a prediction about how agents operate differentially to
navigate the challenges that come with group living: the former suggests that social success
results from an individual’s ability to exploit the cues of others, while the latter suggests that
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an individual’s ability to cooperate using the cues of others it’s what needed to succeed at
group living. Thus, by comparing two species that vary in their despotism (Matsumura,
1999), we can test whether experience exploiting versus cooperatively using the visual cues
of others results in better visual perspective taking abilities.
In our experiment, we compared the performance of rhesus and Barbary macaques
on a well-validated looking time measure of visual perspective taking, one that has been
successfully used to test both human infants (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon 2005; Luo &
Baillargeon 2007; for a review see Baillargeon, Scott, & He 2010) and non-human primates
(e.g., Arre, Clark, & Santos 2019; Horschler, Santos, & Maclean 2019; Marticorena et al. 2011;
Martin and Santos 2014). Specifically, we collected a new dataset in a population of Barbary
macaques and compared that to a previously published dataset from a population of rhesus
macaques who were tested on an identical task (Marticorena et al. 2011, Experiment 1). In
this task, subjects watch as an agent (a human experimenter) acts either consistently or
inconsistently with what she’s previously seen. Monkeys watched as a human experimenter
saw a desired object move into one of two boxes and then searched for the hidden object. If
subjects expect that the experimenter should act consistently with her visual perspective,
then they should look longer when she reaches for that object in the empty box than when
she reaches for the object in the box where both she and the subject saw the object enter.
Subjects’ expectations about this event are then measured using looking time to the
experimental setup.
The logic of the looking time method is that subjects will look longer at an unexpected
event that violates their expectations than at a control expected event (Winters, Dubuc, &
Higham 2015). Looking time measures have been used widely in the developmental
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literature for decades to test human infants’ expectations about both the physical
(Baillargeon 1995; Baillargeon 1997; Sobel & Kirkham 2006; Hood, Carey, & Prasaba 2000,
Feigenson, Carey, & Spelke 2002; Wynn 1992) and social world (Onishi and Baillargeon
2005; Luo & Baillargeon 2007; Luo 2011) and for the last three decades have also been used
to study expectations in non-human primate subjects both those involving physical objects
(e.g., Cheries et al. 2006; De Petrillo & Rosati 2019; Munakata et al. 2001; Santos, Barnes, &
Mahajan 2005; Santos & Hauser 2002; Shutts et al. 2009) as well as the actions of social
agents (e.g., Arre, Clark, & Santos 2019; Martin & Santos 2014; Horschler, Santos, & MacLean
2019; Drayton & Santos 2016; Santos & Hauser 1999). Moreover, several previously
published studies have included control conditions that test for deflationary explanations of
subjects’ performance. These control experiments have shown that subjects show this
pattern of looking longer at an unexpected reaching event only in cases in which the agent
has seen the objects’ movements and thus knows where the object is (e.g., Marticorena et al.
2011; Horschler, Santos, & Maclean 2019). In this way, the method we use here has long been
considered a valid test of visual perspective understanding both in the comparative and
developmental psychology literatures.

Methods
Subjects. We compared the performance of two species of macaques: rhesus
macaques (n = 62; 22F, 40M; mean 8.18 years) from a previously collected dataset
(Marticorena et al. 2011, Experiment 1), and Barbary macaques (n = 80; 39F, 41M; mean
10.5 years) [for a full subject breakdown by age, sex, and condition please see Table 1]. Our
population of Barbary macaques lived at the Trentham Monkey Forest in Trentham, England.
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Monkeys at this site are provisioned daily, given ad libitum access to water, and receive
otherwise no medical intervention. The park is open to the public, so the monkeys are
habituated to humans via the park visitors and site staff, and cognitive and behavior work
has been conducted there for the last few decades. Monkeys at the park live in two social
groups with individuals diverse in age and rank.
We also used data from a previously published study (Marticorena et al. 2011) on a
population of rhesus macaques living at the Cayo Santiago Biological Field Station in Punta
Santiago, Puerto Rico (Rawlins and Kessler 1986). Monkeys in this population inhabit a small
island off the east coast of Puerto Rico, where they are provisioned daily, given ad libitum
access to water, and receive otherwise no medical intervention. Research has been
conducted at the field site for over 80 years (for a review, see Drayton & Santos 2016),
including studies using similar looking time methods (Marticorena et al. 2011; Hughes &
Santos 2012; Martin & Santos 2014; Drayton & Santos 2018; Horschler, Santos, & MacLean
2019; Arre, Clark, & Santos 2019). The monkeys on the island live in six social groups, which
include individuals diverse in age and rank.
In total, we successfully tested (80) Barbary macaques. We approached another 33
Barbary monkeys that did not successfully complete the session either because the subject
was interfered with or displaced by another monkey (2), stopped attending to the stimuli
(4), walked away (1), or had seen the entire study at an earlier date (26). The session success
rate (71%) is similar to that of previously published cognitive testing with free-ranging
monkey populations (Bettle & Rosati 2019; Marticorena et al. 2011; Hughes & Santos 2012;
Martin & Santos 2014; Drayton & Santos 2018; Horschler, Santos, & MacLean 2019; Arre,
Clark, & Santos 2019). Consistent with other recent cognitive studies completed at Cayo
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Santiago and Trentham Monkey Forest (Bettle & Rosati 2019; Drayton & Santos 2017;
Drayton & Santos 2018; Horschler, Santos, & MacLean 2019; Arre, Clark, & Santos 2019),
subjects were not enticed or rewarded for their task performance in any way. All subjects
were free to walk away from the testing situation at any point during the experimental
session.
Apparatus. In the experiment, we presented monkeys with a series of events taking
place on a stage built from foamcore [Figure 1]. As in the previously published study
(Marticorena et al. 2011), our stage was 75cm long and 25.5cm deep. We added a large
screen (60cm tall) to the front of the stage, which we used to occlude the entire display from
the view of the subject. The back of the stage was 55cm, approximately the chest height of
the presenter when she knelt down behind it. Two small boxes were placed on each side of
the stage (15cm x 15cm x 15cm). The two boxes were different colors (blue and orange), and
the inner side of each box was left open but trimmed with fake leaves. This leaf-covered
opening allowed a moving object (a plastic lemon) to enter and exit the two boxes, but
prevented the subject from seeing the contents of the box. We added a length-wise cut
through the center of the stage to create a track, which allowed the lemon to move freely
between the two boxes. A handle attached to the lemon beneath the stage allowed the
experimenter to surreptitiously manipulate the movement of the lemon, out of view of the
subject.
Procedure. The testing procedure was the same across both species; we replicated
the procedure from the original rhesus monkey paper (Experiment 1 of Marticorena et al.
2011) with Barbary macaques.
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Two experimenters ran each session. To begin a session, both experimenters
approached a calmly sitting monkey. The presenter (E1) knelt roughly one to three meters
away and placed the apparatus between herself and the subject monkey. The cameraperson
(E2) then stood beside E1 and began filming the subject. Each study session consisted of
three, ten-second trials: two familiarization trials and one test trial [Figure 1]. The
cameraperson completed the timing of the trial. At the start of each trial, when the E1
revealed the apparatus main stage, the E1 called out ‘now’ to indicate both that the monkey
was looking at the apparatus and that the E2 should begin timing using a stopwatch on the
back of the camera. At the conclusion of 10 seconds, the E2 called out ‘stop’ to indicate the
end of the trial.
Within each experimental session each subject monkey three trials total: two
familiarization trials and one test trial. Each trial began approximately 15-30 seconds after
the conclusion of the trial prior, which is about the length of time it takes E1 to lift the
occluder and reset the stage. The goal of the familiarizations was to acquaint monkeys with
the actions they would see in later in the test trial. In the first familiarization trial
(familiarization to the action), monkeys watched as the occluder dropped and E1 reached
into one of the two boxes [Figure 1, B1 + B2], called “now” and then held that position for 10
seconds, during which time the monkeys’ looking was recorded. The E2 called “stop” at the
conclusion of the trial. In the second familiarization trial (familiarization to the object),
monkeys watched as the occluder dropped and E1 looked down at the object [Figure 1, C], a
plastic lemon, sitting in the center of the stage for the duration of the trial. As soon as the
occluder dropped the E1 called “now” and the E2 called “stop” at the conclusion of the 10
seconds.
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In the final trial, the test trial, monkeys were randomly assigned to one of two possible
outcomes, an expected outcome and an unexpected outcome. In both conditions, the
monkeys first watched as the occluder dropped with E1 looking at an empty stage [Figure 1,
B]. The lemon then emerged from the blue box [Figure 1, D] and then (depending on the side
condition), either moved back into that same blue box (same side condition) [Figure 1, D1],
or crossed the stage and entered the orange box (different side condition) [Figure 1, D2].
Consistent with the original study (Marticorena et al. 2011), monkeys were presented with
one of two possible test outcome conditions, an expected and an unexpected condition. In
the expected condition [Figure 1, D1 then D3, or D2 then D4], E1 reached into the box she
just watched the lemon go into (acting consistently with her visual perspective), and in the
unexpected condition [Figure 1, D1 then D4 or D2 then D3], E1 reached into the empty box
(acting inconsistently with her visual perspective). In both conditions, the E1 called “now”
when she had completed the reaching motion, and held the reaching position for the
duration of the trial until E2 called stop. If subject monkeys tracked the visual perspective of
E1 and expected her to act consistently with her visual perspective, then they should look
longer when she acts inconsistently with her visual perspective (unexpected condition) and
reaches for the object in the empty box than when she acts consistently with her visual
perspective (expected condition) and reaches into the box where she knows the lemon to be.
We counterbalanced both the side the object was on (same vs. different side) and the test
outcome (expected and unexpected) across subjects. In order to be considered a successful
session, subject monkeys needed to complete all three 10-second trials.
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Data coding and analysis. All sessions were coded using MPEG Streamclip (Cinque,
2008). Each session was clipped into three 10-second trials and given a randomized
identifying code to remove all identifying information (including subject ID, trial number,
condition, and session type) from the filename of each individual video clip. The clips begin
at the “now” audio cue that E1 gave to start the trial while the monkey was looking at the
experimental set-up. Thus, the coder was able to infer the location of the experimental setup
by looking at the position of the monkeys’ eyes in the video. Using this initial looking location
of the monkey subjects, two independent experimenters coded looking-time, or the amount
of time the subject attended to the entire experimental setup during each trial, in frames (30
frames per second). Inter-observer reliability was high for both the original rhesus dataset
(Pearson’s R = 0.91) and the Barbary dataset (Pearson’s R = 0.94), which is consistent with
other studies from these field sites (Drayton & Santos 2017; Rosati et al. 2018; Horschler et
al. 2019; Arre, Clark, & Santos 2019).
Additionally, to ensure that any differences or similarities found are not an artifact of
coding differences between the two datasets, we had two new coders re-code the entire
dataset. The same procedure was used to redact any identifying information. Inter-observer
reliability was again high, both between the two new coders (Pearson’s R=0.92) and between
each of the new coders and the original coder (Pearson’s R=0.94 and 0.89, respectively). Data
from the first coder was used for the purpose of the data analysis, though the conclusions
are the same regardless of which set of codes was used.
We used RStudio statistical software, Version 1.0.153 (R Core Team 2016) for data
analysis. To test whether Barbary macaques pass the visual perspective taking test, we ran
an independent samples t-test to see whether looking time across the two conditions
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(expected and unexpected) varied significantly. To test our main prediction about species
differences in task performance, we ran a two-way ANOVA comparing looking time across
the two different conditions (expected and unexpected) and species (rhesus and Barbary
macaques). Finally, we ran a linear mixed model to look at demographic differences (species,
sex, and age) in looking time across all subjects.

Results
To test whether Barbary macaques make accurate predictions about another agent’s
behavior using her visual perspective, we first ran an independent samples t-test to
investigate the effect of condition on looking behavior in Barbary macaques. If Barbary
macaques are able to take the visual perspective of the presenting agent, then they should
look longer when the agent acts inconsistently with her visual perspective and reaches for
the object in the empty box (unexpected condition) than when she reaches for the object in
the correct box (expected condition), where both she and the subject know the object to be.
Consistent with this prediction, Barbary subjects (n = 80) did indeed look significantly longer
in the unexpected (M = 5.24s, SD = 2.95) versus the expected (M = 3.83s, SD = 2.32) condition,
(t(78) = -2.37, p = 0.020, d = 0.530).
To be sure that monkeys assigned to the inconsistent reach condition were not
looking longer across the entire study session, we also confirmed that the looking during the
familiarization trials were the same between conditions. Here we used an independent
samples t-test, and found no significant difference in average looking time between
conditions in the first familiarization trial (t(78) = 0.028, p = 0.977; expected condition mean
= 4.78s, SD = 2.94; unexpected condition mean = 4.76s, SD = 2.56). The same was true in the
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second familiarization trial, (t(78) = -1.194, p = 0.236; expected condition mean = 5.10s, SD
= 3.18; unexpected condition mean = 5.90s, SD = 2.82). Given that the looking time did not
differ significantly between the two conditions in either of the first two familiarization trials,
we can conclude that any differences observed in the test trial reflects actual differences in
attention between conditions and were not an artifact of more general differences in subject
attention.
We then explored whether Barbary macaques’ performance differed from that of
rhesus macaques using a two-way ANOVA (n = 142; Barbary macaques, n = 80; Rhesus
macaques, n = 62) to examine the effect of species and condition on looking time. Overall, we
found no significant interaction between condition and species (F(1,138 = 0.015, p =
0.90136), meaning that a subject’s species had no significant effect on its looking pattern
between conditions [Figure 2]. We also looked at the overall differences in looking behavior
between species and condition using two independent sample t-tests. We found a significant
effect of condition on looking time (t(140) = 3.17, p = 0.001, d = 0.532); regardless of species,
subjects looked longer on unexpected test trials (M = 4.85s, SD = 2.92) as compared to the
expected test trials (M = 3.48s, SD = 2.21). We also tested species differences in overall
looking time (regardless of condition). Here, (t(140) = 1.92, p = 0.057, d = 0.325) we found
no significant difference in the amount of time that Barbary macaques looked at the
experimental setup, regardless of condition, (M = 4.53s, SD = 2.73) as compared to rhesus
macaques (M = 3.67s, SD = 2.51) .
In our final set of analyses, we investigated two demographic factors (sex and age)
and overall looking patterns of monkey subjects in the test trial using a linear mixed model.
Our base model included only trial condition (expected baseline), and confirmed our initial
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finding that subjects look longer in the unexpected, as compared to the expected condition.
In all monkey subjects, an initial model adding subject species as a linear predictor did not
improve model fit, compared to a base model with only condition as a predictor [SI Table S1;
species model versus base model: F(1) = 2.11, p = 0.1491.] This pattern of results indicates
that rhesus and Barbary subjects did not vary in their looking time in the test trial. We also
looked at whether sex affected monkeys’ task attention; a model adding subject sex as a
linear predictor did not improve model fit, as compared to the base model with only
condition as a predictor [SI Table S1; sex model versus base model: F(1) = 3.65, p = 0.0580].
This finding shows that male and female subjects of both species did not vary in their looking
time by in the test trial. Finally, in line with previous work comparing rhesus and Barbary
macaques (Rosati & Santos, 2017), we investigated how age affected monkey attention to
the task using a model adding subject age as a linear predictor. Adding age as a predictor to
the model did improve model fit, as compared to the base model with only condition as a
predictor [SI Table S1; age model versus base model: F(1) = 8.82, p = 0.004], indicating that
in both conditions, looking time decreased as a function of age (see SI Figure S1 depicting
this effect between age cohorts).
Discussion
Here, we found that Barbary macaques can take the visual perspective of another
agent and make an accurate prediction about her behavior. This finding is consistent with a
previously collected dataset (Marticorena et al. 2011) on rhesus macaques using the same
task. Both Barbary and rhesus macaques look significantly longer in the unexpected
condition, in which an agent acts inconsistently with her visual perspective and reaches for
an object in an empty box, as compared to the expected condition, where she reaches
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towards the box that she and the subject both know the object to be. In short, these two
species show no differences in their ability to track other agents’ visual perspective, and are
both capable of taking the visual perspective of a human agent.
The results presented here are in contrast to some of the existing work investigating
how species differences in social tolerance affect social cognition. Previous work in these
two species (Joly et al. 2017; Rosati & Santos 2017) found that social tolerance seems to
affect several aspects of these species’ social cognitive abilities. Joly and colleagues suggest
that their results show tolerant macaque species outperform less tolerant species of
macaques on some tests of social cognition (Joly et al. 2017). It is important to note that the
task at which the experimenters observed the most strong difference between species was a
“social object choice task” which required subjects to follow a human’s pointing cue, and that
in fact, consistent with our findings here, the experimenters found no significant differences
in task performance in gaze-following or intention-reading tasks within the same test
battery of Joly et al., 2017). Thus, any species differences others have observed may play out
as life-long effects (e.g., Barbary macaques but not rhesus macaques maintain high-levels of
gaze following into senescence, Rosati & Santos 2017; see also, Rosati et al. 2016) rather than
a measurable difference at a single life stage. Our results suggest no difference in adult social
cognition performance between these two species despite their large differences in social
tolerance but do not rule out differences within different developmental stages of the two
species.
Given these results— and convergent work showing superior social cognitive abilities
in tolerant bonobos as compared to despotic chimpanzees (Herrmann, et al. 2010)— we
consider a few possibilities for why we found no difference in performance between tolerant
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Barbary macaques and despotic rhesus monkeys. The first possibility is that the capacity to
recognize other agents’ visual perspective is not affected by a species’ social tolerance in the
way that gaze following and other socio-cognitive capacities are. The capacity to understand
how others will act based on where they are looking is an early-emerging capacity in human
development (e.g., Luo & Baillargeon 2007; Onishi & Baillargeon 2005), one that many
scholars have argued may emerge innately (Baillargeon, Scott, & He 2010), perhaps even in
non-human primates. It is therefore possible that the capacity to predict others’ behaviors
based on visual perspective is one that many social species share despite divergent social
ecologies.
A second possible explanation concerns potential limitations in previous studies of
species differences in these two species. One of the two previous studies observing
differences in social cognition performance across macaque species including Barbary and
rhesus macaques (Joly et al. 2017) had relatively small sample sizes (n = 11 for both species)
at least relative to the studies presented here (n = 62 and n = 80 for rhesus and Barbary
macaques, respectively). In addition, Joly and colleagues’ sample had sex ratios that were
relatively imbalanced across species (Barbary: 7F, 4M; rhesus: 2F, 9M). We know from
previous work in adults of these species that there are sex differences in social motivation
and cognition (e.g. Almeling et al. 2016; Almeling et al. 2017; Rosati et al. 2016; Rosati et al.
2018; Rosati & Santos 2017). For these reasons, it is difficult to rule out whether the specieslevel differences Joly and colleagues observed are indeed differences across species or
whether they may instead reflect individual and/or sex differences across the two specific
sample populations used in this study, as others have suggested of phylogenetic comparative
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work using single populations to define a species’ cognitive characteristics (Many Primates
et al., 2019).
Another possibility concerns the age of subjects we tested. One previous study that
observed species differences in Barbary and rhesus macaque social cognition (Rosati &
Santos 2017) only observed such differences later in life; specifically, Rosati & Santos (2017)
found that older Barbary monkeys living in tolerant social groups seem to maintain their
gaze following abilities in old age whereas older despotic rhesus macaques show age-related
declines (Rosati & Santos 2017; Rosati et al. 2016). Scholars have previously suggested that
the varying social tolerance environments might lead to different paces of development
(Krupenye, MacLean, & Hare, 2017), predicting that species in socially tolerant
environments may have a delayed development of perspective-taking abilities because the
pressures for refining visual perspective taking abilities are not as intense. Under this view,
we would expect younger individuals in more competitive species to show more adult-like
perspective taking than younger individuals in more socially tolerant species.
Taken together then, this previous work suggests that we might expect
developmental differences in rhesus macaques and Barbary macaques. Unfortunately, our
current sample did not include a large enough sample of older monkeys of each species to
test these predictions specifically. However, we did find that across all subjects’ test trials,
subject looking time decreased as a function of age, regardless of condition (see SI Figure S1
depicting this effect between age cohorts); the model adding subject age as a linear predictor
did improve model fit, as compared to the base model with only condition as a predictor [age
model versus base model: F(1) = 8.82, p = 0.004]. In other words, regardless of the
experimental condition, older subjects are looking less long at the experimental setup in the
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test trial than younger subjects. Future work should therefore investigate the possibility that
despotic macaque species differentially lose their attention to the visual perspective of
others across the lifespan relative to more tolerant species.
A final caveat concerns the specific two populations we tested. Both of the macaque
groups we tested are free-living, but captive, populations. It is possible that these subjects
may not have to compete for as many resources (food, water) as a wild population. As a
result, there’s a chance that wild-living animals might show a different pattern of
performance than the populations we compared here. Nonetheless, it’s worth noting that
both of our populations show much of the competition typical of wild populations in our freeranging setting. Both populations we tested have ample opportunities to compete over social
resources like grooming, mating, and infant handling opportunities (Rawlins & Kessler 1986;
Maestripieri, & Hoffman 2012; Carne, Wiper, & Semple 2011). Further, individuals in these
populations engage in physical altercations to resolve hierarchical disputes and also
disperse between groups (Boelkins & Wilson 1972). Thus, while our free-ranging subjects
may have relatively limited competition over non-social resources, individuals in these
populations have ample opportunity to compete socially. Future research, however, could
follow up with similar tests in wild-living or captive populations.
In addition, future work could explore how rhesus and Barbary macaques initially
develop their visual perspective taking abilities. It is possible that tolerant and despotic
species develop this capacity along different ontogenetic trajectories (Rosati et al. 2014;
Gómez 2005). Indeed, recent work suggest that rhesus macaques may require some
experience before developing the capacity to make predictions about another agent’s
perspective (Arre, Santos, & Clark 2020), raising the possibility that Barbary macaques may
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develop this ability earlier than rhesus macaques due to their experiences in a tolerant social
environment. In this way, testing whether these two species show divergent ontogenetic
patterns, even though they show relatively similar performance as adults, would be a fruitful
next step for this line of work.
In conclusion, we observed that two species that vary in their social tolerance do exhibit at
least one similar social cognitive ability as adults— the capacity to make accurate predictions
based on an agent’s visual perspective. This convergence suggests that there may be some
social cognitive abilities that are fundamental to any type of social living, and that social
tolerance may play less of an important role in the emergence of these capacities. Our results
hint that visual perspective understanding may be one such core part of social living that
emerges regardless of socioecology.
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Species
Sex
Barbary
macaques F
(Macaca sylvanus)
M
Rhesus
macaques F
(Macaca mulatta)
M

Condition
Expected
Unexpected
Expected
Unexpected
Expected
Unexpected
Expected
Unexpected

N
19
20
21
20
10
12
22
18

Age (years)
11.1
11.4
10.1
9.4
8.9
7.17
9.14
7.5

Table 1. Subject sex and age breakdown by condition within each species.

110

Factor
Estimate
s.e.
Z
p-value
condition
1.3014
0.4217
3.086
0.002
(expected
baseline)
species
-0.6151
0.4239
-1.451
0.149
(Barbary
baseline)
sex
(female 0.8088
0.4233
1.911
0.058
baseline)
Age
-0.0994
0.0335
-2.969
0.004
SI Table 1. Potential demographic factors influencing looking time (seconds) towards the
experimental setup during the test trial. The parameters here are from each individual model
using condition plus the listed factor in that row.

Chapter 3 Figures
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Figure 1. Experimental apparatus and photos of each trial type. (A) The apparatus with the
occluder up. (B) The apparatus with the occluder down. (B1 + B2) Trial 1: Familiarization to
action; (C) Trial 2: Familiarization to object and (D-D4) Trial 3: Test trial: the subject and
presenter watch as the lemon exits the blue box (D) and either (D1) returns to the blue box
or (D2) crosses the stage and enters the orange box. The presenter then either acts
consistently with her visual perspective, (if D1 then D3; if D2 then D4) reaching the box
which she and the subject just watched the lemon disappear into (the expected condition)
or acts inconsistently with her visual perspective, (if D1 then D4; if D2 then D3) reaching into
the box opposite of the lemon (the unexpected condition)
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Figure 2. Mean looking time across species (rhesus and Barbary macaques) and test
condition (expected and unexpected).
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SI Figure 1. Subject looking times between expected and unexpected conditions in the test
trial, split by subject age cohort (juveniles = subjects under 5 years of age, adults = subjects
above 5 years of age).
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Chapter 4: Do monkeys attend to age when gaze following?
Arre, A.M., Stumph, E., Hengartner, A.C., & Santos, L.R.

Social living comes with many challenges, including filtering for reliable and useful
information and agents. From a young age, human children show preferences for different
types of people when learning, in part, to help mitigate the challenge of persistent learning
opportunities. These preferences include agent age, or category (e.g. teacher) as well as taskspecific markers such as expert. Is this ability a unique feature of our teaching-centric
culture, or do other socially living species, which face many of the same challenges, show
similar preferences when learning from other conspecifics? To investigate this question, we
looked at nonhuman primate preferences for agents of different ages in a gaze following task.
Gaze following, or the propensity to follow the gaze of others, is a useful behavior with which
to study these learning preferences as it is a behavior frequently used by social species to
learn about their environment from other agents, and one that is well understood in
nonhuman primate species. Here, across two experiments we looked at whether monkeys
attend differently to gaze cues from adult and infant conspecific images and also the role that
development plays in these preferences. Overall, we found that while subjects will gaze
follow from a static image (Experiment 1) they do not seem to preferentially follow the gaze
of adult or infant conspecifics (Experiment 2). Further, while adults gaze followed more than
juveniles on this task, juveniles showed overall more social attention, looking longer at the
conspecific photos. We found no developmental differences in preferences for an adult
versus an infant conspecific as sources of information; juvenile and adult subjects did not
gaze follow differently from these two conspecific photos. Taken together, our results
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suggest that non-human primates may not be sensitive to age when following gaze. Future
work then should investigate primate preferences to agents varying on other dimensions to
see whether our human preferences for selecting others from whom to learn are unique
features of our teaching-centric culture.
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Introduction
On a daily basis, we are inundated with social cues from other agents. These cues vary
in their complexity, from simple gaze direction cues to complicated facial expressions, and
the individuals presenting these cues often vary on any number of features including age,
sex, group, and status. Despite this, humans are able to rapidly integrate these informational
cues when making social decisions (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov et al., 2015; Willis
& Todorov, 2006). How do humans choose which signals to attend to and which to ignore,
and what allows us to make these split second discriminations?
From a young age, human children are particular adept at discerning whom to attend
to and show a number of biases to make these decisions. For instance, children are good at
identifying competent adults. In a number of different contexts, children prefer to learn from
competent over incompetent adults, and use markers such as reliability, efficiency, accuracy,
and even confidence to label these potential teachers (Chow et al., 2008; Zmyj et al., 2010;
Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Jaswal & Malone, 2007). Children also
show a preference for learning from similar others, and will more faithfully attend to
demonstrations from ingroup members or more familiar others than outgroup members
(Learmonth et al., 2005; Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Lucas, et al., 2017; Gruber, Thibaud, et al.,
2019). Children also show a strong age bias when selecting others as sources of information:
children prefer to learn from adults rather than peers when learning about a task or object
(Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012; Seehagen & Herbert, 2011; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Elekes &
Kiraly, 2012; Kachel et al., 2018; 2021), and when learning a new skill or game (Rakoczy et
al., 2010). It seems that, from a young age, humans can discern that other agents vary in what
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they may or may not be able to teach us, and as such children differentially attend to
information from agents in these different categories.
But how did these preferences come about evolutionarily? Humans are unique in
their propensity to seek out teaching and learning experiences (Whiten, 2000; Tomasello,
Kruger, & Ratner, 1993; Whiten & van de Waal, 2017). Not even our closest living relatives,
non-human primates, show a proclivity to teach or learn from others to the same degree
(Hoppit et al., 2008; Caro & Hauser, 1992; Strauss & Ziv, 2004). Nevertheless, primates face
many of the same challenges as humans, including complex skill acquisition and deciding
who to attend to in large social groups. Is human-like experience teaching and learning from
efficient teachers a pre-requisite for preferring to learn from different types of agents? Or do
non-humans primates also learn from some agents more than others at least in some
domains?
Although nonhuman primates are more limited in the domains in which they socially
learn from others than humans are, primates do seem capable of learning from others in tool
use and skill learning contexts. Some of the foundational work in the former domain
investigated differences in rates of social learning in a tool use task between human children
and chimpanzees (Nagell, Olguin, & Tomasello, 1993). In this task, a human demonstrator
presented a solution to a problem (retrieving a desirable object just out of reach) via novel
tool use (a rakelike tool). The demonstrator varied how they used the tool, using two distinct
methods to retrieve the object using the rake. Both children and chimpanzees performed
better on the task when they saw the demonstrator performing the action, suggesting that
both populations learned something from witnessing the demonstration. But the species
varied in how the learned the task. Children faithfully copied whichever specific
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demonstration they had seen, quickly learning how to use the tool and solve the problem
because of their fidelity to imitating the human demonstrator. In contrast, chimpanzees were
better at solving the task after seeing the experimenter perform the task, but they did not
reliably copy the specific demonstration they had seen. Thus it seemed that chimpanzees
socially learned that they could get a specific outcome, even though they did not copy the
speciific process the demonstrator used, Subsequent studies with chimpanzees (MyowaYamakoshi & Matsuzawa, 2000; 1999; Whiten et al., 2009; Whiten, Horner, & MarshallPescini, 2005) and other apes (Stoinksi et al., 2001; Stoinski & Whiten, 2003) have found
convergent results. That is, across the board in these task-learning experiments, human
children seem attuned to the demonstrator’s actions in a way that nonhuman primates are
not. At least in these task-learning contexts, primates seem too distracted by the goal of the
task outcome to attend and mimic the demonstration of the task expert, copying only the
behaviors required to “pass” the task.
Given these results, one might predict that the identity of the demonstrator does not
matter to the non-human primate learners, as it seems that nonhuman subjects rely heavily
on the outcome of a task and not the demonstrations presented. Only a few studies have
assessed the role of the demonstrator’s demographic factors in learning outcomes in a skill
learning context. One such study tested these preferences in capuchin monkeys. In this study,
researchers tracked how young nut-cracking novice monkeys attended to the behaviors of
others (Coehlo et al., 2015). They found that young capuchin monkeys choose to observe
older and more dominant others’ demonstrations. Similar to human children, young
capuchins also seemed sensitive to reliability, preferring to observe more proficient others
with higher productivity rates (Coehlo et al., 2015). In another similar study, Canteloup and
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colleagues (2020) tested individual vervet monkey learning outcomes on a foraging box task
in response to task experts of varying kinship, sex, age, and rank. Their results indicated that
out of all these factors, the only dimension predictive of transmission of the task solution
was rank— individual vervet monkeys were much more likely to learn the solution from a
higher-ranking individual. Overall, then, primates appear to most reliably use rank when
deciding from whom to learn, preferring higher ranking informants over lower ranking
informants (Coehlo, et al., 2015; Canteloup, Hoppitt, & van de Waal, 2020; but see also
Bottling et al., 2018), and in some instances, age, preferring older individuals over younger
(Coehlo, et al., 2015).
While the studies presented above present an interesting foundation for our theories
about comparative social learning, they are limited in two ways. First, the species most
frequently tested in these social learning tasks are species that can modify and manipulate
tools (Whiten et al., 2004), and can learn how to create and modify tools by observing others
(Biro et al., 2003; Tutin et al., 2001). For this reason, the current studies are limited in their
scope in that the species tested, as part of their natural ecologies, already demonstrate an
ability to learn skills from observing others. A second problem concerns the fact that many
previous studies were designed to compare primates’ performance with that of human
children, and thus tend to use the sorts of puzzle box and object manipulation tasks that
appeal to human children. We know that primates can learn from others in a lot of different
contexts; learning how to physically manipulate an object is not the only way that other
agents’ can help an individual learn. For both of these reasons, the existing studies testing
how primates learn from different agents may be missing some of the most important
contexts in which primates actually learn from one another.
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The primary way primates use others as sources of information isn’t about objects
but is instead to learn about their environment more generally. Take for example, primates’
ability to follow the gaze of others. Gaze following allows primates to use the attention of
others to learn about important features of our environment, like threats, resources, and the
presence of other individuals (Shepherd, 2010; Grossman, 2017). Primates are capable of
using the gaze of other agents to learn about their environments in both in experimental
object choice tasks (e.g. Call, Hare, & Tomasello, 1998; Itakura et al., 1999; Barth, Reaux, &
Povinelli, 2005). but also in more naturalistic testing environments as well (REFS). Even
when there is no immediate obvious reward involved, many species of primates naturally
follow the gaze of both humans and conspecific experimenters (for a review, see Rosati &
Hare, 2009), including apes (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 1998), monkeys
(Emery et al., 1997; Tomasello, Call, & Hare 1998; Neiworth et al., 2002; Burkart & Heschl,
2006) and lemurs (Shepherd and Platt, 2008; Ruiz, Roeder, and Byrne, 2009; Sandel,
MacLean, and Hare, 2011). Primates also appear sensitive to the fact that gaze cues are
intentional and informational, as they adapt their gaze behavior with respect to the
experimenters’ physical and perceptual states. When the experimenters’ view differs from
their own, primates will adjust their physical position to align with the gaze of an
experimenter (Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007; MacLean & Hare
2012; Bettle & Rosati, 2019). In this way, gaze following work shows that many primate
species seem to gaze follow based on an expectation that the experimenters’ use of a gaze
cue is meant to contain information about the environment to the subject.
Along these lines then, gaze appears to be a valuable cue that primates can use other
agents for in order to learn about their environment. Despite its usefulness for primate
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learning, relatively little work has looked at how primates flexibly moderate their gaze
responses in response to different agents’ gaze cues. An observational study (Grampp et al.,
2019) found that, juvenile vervets in a naturalistic context relied more heavily on older and
more dominant conspecifics as sources of information. In their observations, young vervet
monkeys spent more time watching individuals in these categories, as compared to lowranking individuals. In a more controlled task, Foulsham et al. (2010) investigated whether
monkeys were sensitive to the identity of the gaze cue presenter. Consistent with work in
adult humans, researchers found that monkeys more readily followed the gaze of dominant,
high ranking individuals as compared to the gaze of low-ranking individuals (Shepherd,
Deaner, and Platt, 2006). Unfortunately, while it is possible that monkeys in this task might
be using social rank as a marker for social expertise, Shepherd and colleagues (2006) pointed
out that monkeys’ performance may instead be explained by a more reflexive mechanism—
facial dominance (i.e. the facial structure of dominant versus subordinate individuals) is an
extremely salient cue in primates (Rosenfield et al., 2019), and thus might provide a
sufficient explanation without needing to posit a richer preference for learning from
dominant agents.
To date, there have been few comparative studies assessing whether primates
differentially attend to and learn from individuals whose demographic factors might track
with social expertise. The goal of this chapter is to explore this issue directly in a new primate
species: the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta). Rhesus macaques are one of the most wellstudied primates in the domain of comparative social cognition (Drayton & Santos, 2016).
Rhesus macaques, like humans, live in complex, multi-male, multi-female social groups
(Maestripieri & Hoffman, 2012). They exhibit a steep dominance hierarchy and engage in
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frequent bouts of aggression to maintain social order (Maestripieri & Hoffman, 2012;
Thierry, Iwaniuk, & Pellis, 2000).
Living in such large, complex groups requires rhesus monkeys to be perceptive to
other individual’s social cues in order to navigate social interactions with both allies and
adversaries. There is a lot of evidence that rhesus monkes follow the gaze of others. This is
true in a variety of contexts. Macaques will follow the gaze of both conspecifics (Tomasello,
Call, & Hare, 1998; Emery et al., 1997) and humans (Drayton & Santos, 2017; Rosati & Santos,
2017; Rosati et al., 2016), from live demonstrations (Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 1998), video
(Emery et al., 1997; Putnam et al., 2016) and photo (Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt, 2006)
presentations, and from a fairly young age (Rosati et al., 2016; Tomasello, Hare, &
Fogelmman, 2001).
But do rhesus macaques follow gaze differentially depending on an individual’s
identity or expertise? As reviewed above, we know from a single study in the lab that rhesus
macaques do preferentially follow the gaze of high-ranking others as compared to lowranking others (Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt, 2006). However, this study had a relatively
sample size (n=12) and the subjects were limited in the number of social interactions that
they themselves had experienced and seen others experience in the sterilized lab
environment. Here, we build on this past study— testing wheher macaques follow gaze
differentially depending on an individual’s identity in much more naturalistic population. In
our study site— Cayo Santiago— macaques are free-ranging and allowed to engage in social
interactions throughout the day. Individuals in this population vary greatly in demographic
features of interest, and would have a lot of experience interacting with others and following
cues. As a function of this large social living then, the rhesus monkeys of Cayo Santiago are
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faced with a more complex computational challenge of deciding from whom to follow cues
from than lab-living monkeys.
The goal of this study was to test whether macaques in a free-living population
showed a human-like tendency to learn from agents of some identities over others. We were
interested in whether subjects would preferentially “gaze follow” from some conspecific
informants more than others. Although a previous study exploring this issue had focused on
varying the rank of the informant to be gaze followed (Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt, 2006), we
varied whether the gaze-cueing conspecific was either an adult or infant. We chose age as a
proxy for social expertise here because older macaques would have more expertise
attending to, following, and producing their own cues for other agents. Thus, if subjects are
tracking social expertise, then we would expect them to gaze follow more often when
presented wtith social experts, namely adult conspecifics, as compared to social novices,
infant conspecifics. We therefore presented subjects with a series of photographic images of
an individual rhesus macaque making a gaze cue. We varied whether the photo was of an
adult versus an infant. In line with previous work, we anticipated that if subjects were
attending to the age of the presenter, they would preferentially follow the gaze of an adult
photo as compared to a infant photo. Specifically, we expected that subjects would make
more looks and for longer in the same direction as a photo of an adult gaze cue, as compared
to trials where they see an infant producing a gaze cue.
Previous work with rhesus macaques has also demonstrated that, similar to humans
macaques undergo robust developmental transitions in their gaze following abilities, with
the ability emerging around 5 months of age (Rosati et al., 2016; Tomasello, Hare, and
Fogelman, 2001). Because much of the human developmental literature in the domain of
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social learning finds that young children subjects, are capable of attending differentially to
informants of different ages (e.g. Kachel et al., 2018; Kachel et al., 2019) we wanted to
investigate whether young primates similarly are capable of filtering sources of information
in this way. By testing subjects across the juvenile and adult life stages, we hoped to be able
to map a trajectory of the ability across the primate lifespan.

Experiment 1
Methods
Subjects. In total, we tested 130 rhesus macaques (71F, 59M; ~7.5 years old) in Study 1, 58
juveniles (30F, 28M, ~4.01 years) and 72 adults (41F, 31M, ~10.4 years). We tested rhesus
macaques at the Cayo Santiago Biological Field Station. Cayo Santiago is a small island off the
east coast of Puerto Rico home to approximately 2,000 rhesus monkeys. Monkeys live under
semi-naturalistic conditions in that they are free-ranging, and have access to water and
naturally-growing foliage ad libitum, but are provided provisioned food daily by the field site
staff. Aside from this, the monkeys live in naturally forming social groups spread across the
island, engaging in much inter- and intragroup interactions, and are diverse in sex, age, and
social rank.

Apparatus. We constructed a rectangular box (13.5” x 8” x 25.25”) of white foamcore and
white duct tape [Figure 1] for the apparatus. The box had five solid sides, and we left the top
open to fit the two photo sets inside. On the long-side of the front of the box, we cutout a
small (8” x 10”) rectangular viewing window, affixed with a slightly larger (10.5” x 12”)
rectangular occluder. We used the viewing window and occluder for image presentation. To
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distinguish them from the rest of the box, we covered both the window frame and the
occluders with brightly colored blue duct tape. We mounted each photo (8” x 10”) on a piece
of foamcore and affixed with a handle. To allow for the experimenter to align the photos into
the proper presentation order while staying blind to the content of the stimuli, we taped
brightly colored purple or green duct tape to the back of the photo mount (designating one
direction or the other respectively) and numbered them on the top of the photo’s handle.

Stimuli. We used two sets of images as stimuli in Study 1: one set of an adult male monkey
and one set of an infant male monkey. Both monkeys were outgroup to all subjects. Photo
Set 1 included four images of a high-ranking adult male individual, 6C6, (13 years old). The
first image showed the individual head-on, while the remaining three images showed the
individual gazing in one direction [Figure 2a]. These images were flipped horizontally such
that the two photo sets (one left and one right) were mirror images of each other. Gaze cue
direction and order of photo presentation were counterbalanced across session. Photo Set 2
was identical to Photo Set 1 except for the identity of the monkey [Figure 2b]. We kept all
other demographic information consistent (e.g., rank sex, social group), but instead used a
photo of an infant monkey, AT5 (10 days old). In this way, the only thing different about the
conspecific photo across the two conditions was its age, which we used here as a marker for
social expertise.

Procedure. Two experimenters found a calmly sitting monkey and kneeled approximately
1-3m away. The first experimenter, the presenter (E1), placed the apparatus between herself
and the monkey and called to get the monkey’s attention. The cameraperson (E2) stood
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behind E1 and began filming the session. Once the monkey looked at the apparatus, E1
removed a small occluding door from the front of the apparatus, revealing an 8” x 10” image
of a conspecific. Simultaneously, E1 called “now”, and E2 began timing. At the conclusion of
10 seconds, E2 called “stop”, E1 replaced the occluding door to the front of the box. E1 then
moved on to the next trial. Subsequent trials began immediately after the trial previous one
once the subject began attending to the apparatus. Each experimental session included up to
four 10-second trials (see details below), in which the subject would see four images of the
same conspecific. Half of monkeys were shown an adult photo whereas the other half of
monkeys were shown the infant photo.

Trial Type. Each session included two different types of trials: one encoding trial and up to
three gaze following trials. The goal of the encoding trial— which we presented the subjects
with first as Trial 1— was for the subject monkey to take in the identity of the monkey in the
photos for the following trials. During the encoding trial, E1 got the monkey’s attention, and
then removed the occluding door on the apparatus while simultaneously calling, “now” and
E2 began the timer. The photo behind the occluding door presented a conspecific (adult or
infant) staring straight ahead. At the conclusion of 10 seconds, E2 called “stop”, which
denoted the end of a trial.
After witnessing this encoding trial, subjects received between 1 and 3 gaze following
trials (Trials 2-4). The goal of these trials was to see if subjects would follow the gaze of same
monkey shown in the encoding trial. During gaze following trials, E1 got the monkey’s
attention and then removed the occluding door of the apparatus. Monkeys then saw a photo
of the same monkey (either adult or infant) staring straight ahead. After allowing the monkey
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to look at this image for two seconds while counting out loud, “one, two”, E1 then slid the
image to the right, revealing a photo of the same monkey gazing either left or right. We
expected monkeys to follow the gaze of this second photo, looking in the direction that the
photo depicted the monkey looking. Immediately after this gazing photo was presented, E1
called “now”, and E2 began timing the trial. At the conclusion of 10 seconds, E2 called “stop”,
which denoted the end of a trial. Monkeys were presented with up to three total gaze
following trials.
Monkeys had to complete at least two trials for the session to be considered
successful. 131 individuals completed all four trials, 9 completed three trials, and 25
completed only two trials [see SI Table 1 for detailed exclusion information].

Behavioral Coding. We clipped experimental trials so that they could be coded blind to
condition; we removed all identifying information (including subject ID, trial number,
condition, and session type) from each clip and gave each a randomized identifying code.
One coder coded three variables: same side looking time, different side looking time, and
overall looking time to the apparatus for all of the clips [for definitions of each dependent
variable, see Table 1]. From these values, we were then able to calculate the following
additional dependent variables: first look accuracy, first look behavior, number of looks back
to the apparatus, and number of looks in the same and different directions. Several additional
coders then re-coded each clip for reliability. In total, we used four reliability coders in
Experiment 1 [for a summary see SI Table 3]. Inter-observer reliability was high, greater
than Pearson’s R = 0.90 for all directions, [see SI Table 3] which is consistent with other
studies from this field site (Marticorena et al., 2011; Drayton & Santos, 2017; Rosati et al.,
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2018; Horschler, MacLean, & Santos, 2019; Arre, Clark, & Santos 2019; Bettle & Rosati, 2020).
Data from the first coder was used for the purpose of the data analysis, though the results
are the same regardless of data used.

Data analysis. We completed our analyses using RStudio statistical software, Version
1.3.1093 (RStudio Team, 2020). In the final dataset, we removed all trials where the subject’s
first look behavior indicated that they made no look. To test first look accuracy, we first ran
a binomial test for each gaze cue trial by comparing subjects’ first look accuracy to what we
would expect if they were looking at chance. To test whether overall looking time was
affected by cue presentation, we ran a linear mixed model with trial type (cue versus noncue) as a fixed effect and subject id as a random effect to see whether these factors predicted
dependent variable first look accuracy. To investigate our original question about the role
that the presenter’s identity plays in subjects’ behavioral responses, we first ran a
generalized linear mixed model using presenter identity and trial type as a fixed effects and
subject id as a random effect to see how these factors predicted looking time. Finally, to
explore developmental differences, we categorized each subject by age into one of two age
cohorts: subjects under age 5 were categorized as juveniles, and subjects over the age of 5
were categorized as adults. To look at how a subject’s own age predicted gaze behavior
accuracy, we used a generalized linear mixed model and added age cohort as a fixed effect
and subject id as a random effect to test whether this factor predicted first look accuracy. A
strength of these mixed effects models is that they can account for subject variability both in
the influence that the condition will have on their looking time and also in the effects of
repeated trials within a single subject.
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Results
We began by testing whether subjects’ first looking behavior was accurate in
response to the gaze following cue. In other words, after viewing the photo, did subjects look
first in the direction presented by the gaze cue? If monkey subjects are attending to and using
the gaze cue presented, the number of “accurate” first looks should be significantly higher
than chance (0.50) in the gaze cue trials (Trials 2 – 4). To investigate this, we ran a binomial
test to examine whether the observed number of monkeys who looked in the same direction
as the presented cue differed chance (0.50). Collapsing across all three gaze cue trials and
trial types (adult photo vs. infant photo), binomial tests revealed that subjects were not
significantly more likely to make their first look in the same direction as the gaze cue (Figure
3). In Trial 2, 68 out of 122 subjects looked in the same direction as the presented cue
(proportion = 0.56, p = 0.119), in Trial 3, 57 of 100 subjects, (proportion = 0.57, p = 0.096),
and in Trial 4, 53 of 93 subjects (proportion = 0.57, p = 0.106).
Although this pattern of performance suggests that subjects did not look first towards
the correct direction, it is still possible that they may have spent more time looking in the
same direction of the cue. To investigate this, we compared the total time spent looking in
the same direction as the cue presented across four trials using a linear mixed model. In the
model, we added trial type (no gaze cue versus gaze cue) as a fixed effect and subject id as a
random effect. Here we found that adding trial type as a predictor for same side looking time
significantly improved model fit (Figure 4, χ2 = 12.69, P < 0.001). In other words, subjects
looked longer in the direction that the cue was presented during gaze following trials in
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which a cue is presented, trials 2-4, (M = 1.89 seconds, SD = 1.95) as compared to the
encoding trial in which no cue is presented, trial 1 (M = 1.18 seconds, SD = 1.63).
To test our original question about the role that the cue presenter’s identity plays in
a subject’s behavioral response, we also looked at whether the cue presenter’s identity
predicted both first look accuracy and overall looking time in the same direction in the trials
where a gaze cue was presented (trials 2-4). First we looked at whether cue presenter
identity (adult vs. infant) predicted first look accuracy, and found that it did not; including
cue presenter identity did not improve overall model fit as compared to the base model (χ2
= 1.84, P = 0.174). In other words, subjects were no more likely to make an accurate first look
in response to an adult photo (53%) as compared to an infant photo (60%).
Next we used a linear mixed model to assess how cue presenter identity affected
overall looking time in the right direction. Here we found that adding cue presenter identity
did not improve overall model fit as compared to the base model (χ2 = 0.05, P = 0.815). This
means that subjects spent no additional time looking in the accurate direction in response to
a cue presented by an adult (M = 1.89 seconds, SD = 1.97) as compared to a cue presented by
an infant (M = 1.89 seconds, SD = 1.93).
Finally, to look at whether there were developmental differences in gaze responses,
we first used a generalized linear mixed model to test whether a subject’s own age affected
first look accuracy. We found that including a subject’s age cohort did not improve overall
model fit as compared to the base model (χ2 = 0.261, P = 0.609). In other words, juvenile and
adult subjects were equally adept at using a gaze cue from a photograph to decide where to
look (Figure 11). Next, we used a linear mixed model to look at whether a subject’s age cohort
predicted our second dependent variable, overall looking time. Here we found that adding
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age cohort as a predictor significantly improved model fit (Figure 5): adults looked
significantly longer (M = 2.15 seconds, SD = 2.14) in the same direction as the presented cue,
as compared to juvenile (M = 1.60 seconds, SD = 1.66) subjects (χ2 = 7.94, P < 0.005).

Conclusion
In Experiment 1, we investigated whether monkeys would follow the gaze cue of a
conspecific from a static image using two separate measures: (1) proportion of “accurate”
first looks (i.e. first looks in the same direction as the gaze cue), (2) overall looking time in
the accurate direction (seconds). We found that cue presentation did not seem to affect
subjects’ behavioral responses: subjects’ did not make more first looks in the same direction
as the presented cue (Figure 1). However, subjects did spend more time (seconds) looking
in the same direction as the cue in the trials where the cue was presented, gaze following
cues, as compared to encoding trials, or trials where there was no cue presented. This result
suggests that subjects were able to follow gaze cues from photographs, which allowed us to
test our real question of interest— whether the identity of the photo— adult versus infant—
affected subjects’ behavioral responses. Although we hypothesized that subjects would
follow an adult’s gaze more often than that of an infant, we found no effect of cue presenter
on subject looking behavior. In other words, subjects were no more likely to make a correct
first look (i.e. a first look in the same direction as the cue presented) in response to an adult
versus an infant presenter. Subjects also spent the same amount of time looking in the
direction of cues presented by the adult and infant presenter. Finally, we looked at
developmental differences by comparing juvenile and adult subjects’ looking behavior. Here
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we found that while juveniles and adults did not differ in their overall first look accuracy,
adults did look longer in the same direction as the cue, as compared to juvenile subjects.
In contrast to what might be expected of human children were they to be tested on a
similar paradigm, monkeys did not show any preferences for information from adults over
infants’ when gaze following. One problem with the experimental setup here was that the
cues were presented in isolation— each subject received either a cue from an adult or a cue
from an infant— rather than a choice between two cues. Thus subject performance in
Experiment 1 might not be in line with actual preferences for different agents, but rather a
reflection of monkeys’ propensity to follow gaze cues from photographs more generally. For
this reason, it is difficult to draw conclusions about monkeys’ overall preferences for social
experts since we did not directly pit an adult gaze cue against that of an infant. We reasoned
that we may see different results when the cues are presented in tandem thus forcing
subjects to make a choice. To address this, we ran a follow-up experiment designed to
address this limitation.

Experiment 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to develop a method that would overcome some of the
limitations of Experiment 1. Experiment 2 developed a novel gaze choice paradigm that
presented both the adult and infant gaze cues simultaneously and allowed subjects to choose
which gaze cue to follow. Note that this study design is also more reflective of a naturalistic
social environment, where individuals are often inundated with social information from
multiple agents at one time, and must selectively attend to cues from only the most useful
agents. In line with our original hypothesis, we predicted that if monkeys show the same
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learning preferences as human children, then they should look first and for longer in the
direction of the adult cue as compared to the infant cue .
In Experiment 2, we again tested for developmental differences in gaze following
behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that adults look longer in response to a cue than juvenile
subjects, though they were not more accurate in their first look behavior. Given that adults
seemed to be more accurate at identifying a cue from a photograph in Experiment 1, we
predicted again in Experiment 2 that adult subjects would preferentially follow the cue of
the adult, though we did not predict that juvenile subjects would show the same preference.
Following data collection from Experiment 1, we pre-registered all of the details of
Experiment 2 including the procedure, behavioral coding, and data analysis (please see:
http://aspredicted.org/login.php?a_id=37009&x=SNLKKSoSWWA1LSNAoAf2_wGpIcGaRb
DO8). Unfortunately, data collection had to be cut short due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as
we were midway through when required to leave the field site. As such, details for the first
half of Experiment 2 are reported below.

Methods
Subjects. In total, we tested 74 rhesus macaques (33F, 41M; ~4.84 years old) in Experiment
2, including 45 juveniles (14F, 31M, ~3.32 years) and 29 adults (19F, 10M, ~7.37 years). We
tested the same population of rhesus macaques as in Experiment 1 at the Cayo Santiago
Biological Field Station.

Apparatus. We constructed a new rectangular box (15” x 8” x 25.25”) of white foamcore and
black duct tape [Figure 6] for the apparatus. The box had five solid sides, and we left the top
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open to fit the two photo sets inside. On the long-side of the front of the box, we cutout two
(8” x 10”) rectangular viewing windows, affixed with slightly larger (10.5” x 12”) rectangular
occluders. We used the viewing window and occluder for image presentation. To distinguish
them from the rest of the box, we covered both the window frame and occluder with brightly
colored lime duct tape. We mounted each photo (8” x 10”) on a piece of foamcore and affixed
with a handle. To allow for the experimenter to align the photos into the proper presentation
order while staying blind to the content of the stimuli, we taped brightly colored light or dark
green and blue duct tape to the back of the photo mounts, designating direction (brightness)
and photoset (color) and numbered them on the top of the photo’s handle.

Stimuli. In Experiment 2, we used images of two individuals from the same group: 2E4, a
high-ranking adult female, and i1900V, a high-ranking infant female (Figure 6). We used two
stimuli sets, one set with the adult photos looking to the left and the infant photos looking to
the right, and an alternative photoset with the photos looking the opposite orientation. The
images of each conspecific used were either in the original orientation, or a mirrored image,
such that both sets of photos contained an identical set of photographs, but some were
original photographs and others were mirrored copies.

Procedure. Two experimenters found a calmly sitting monkey and kneeled approximately
1-3m away. The first experimenter, the presenter (E1), placed the apparatus between herself
and the monkey and called to get the monkey’s attention. The cameraperson (E2) stood
behind E1 and began filming the session. Once the monkey looked at the apparatus, E1
removed two small occluding doors from the front of the apparatus, revealing two 8” x 10”
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images of conspecifics (one adult and one infant). Simultaneously, E1 called “now”, and E2
began timing. At the conclusion of 10 seconds, E2 called “stop”, E1 replaced the occluding
doors to the front of the box. E1 then moved on to the next trial. Subsequent trials began
immediately after the trial previous one once the subject began attending to the apparatus.
Each experimental session included up to four 10-second trials, in which the subject would
see four images of each conspecific. The direction that the adult and infant remained the
same within a single experimental session though the position was counterbalanced
between subjects.
Monkeys had to complete at least two trials for the session to be considered
successful. 51 individuals completed all four trials, 14 completed three trials, and 9
completed only two trials [see SI Table 2 for detailed exclusion information].

Behavioral Coding. We clipped the videos of the experimental trials so that they could be
coded blind to condition; we removed all identifying information (including subject ID, trial
number, condition, and session type) from each clip and gave each a randomized identifying
code. One coder coded three variables: same side looking time, different side looking time, and
overall looking time to the apparatus for all of the clips [for definitions of each dependent
variable, see Table 1]. From these values, we were then able to calculate the following
additional dependent variables: first look accuracy, first look behavior, number of looks back
to the apparatus, and number of looks in the same and different directions. Several additional
coders then re-coded each clip for reliability. In total, we used three reliability coders in
Experiment 2 [for a summary see SI Table 3]. Inter-observer reliability was high, greater
than Pearson’s R = 0.94 for all directions [see SI Table 3].
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Data analysis. We completed our analyses using RStudio statistical software, Version
1.3.1093 (RStudio Team, 2020). In the final dataset, we removed all trials where the subject’s
first look behavior indicated that they made no look. In Experiment 2, looks in the same
direction as the adult cue were counted as “correct” and looks in the direction of the infant
cue, while still correct, were counted as “incorrect” for coding purposes. To test first look
accuracy, we first ran a binomial test in each gaze cue trial, to investigate whether subjects
were preferentially using the adult gaze cue over the infant gaze cue, by comparing subjects’
first look behavior to what we would expect if they were looking at chance.

Results
Experiment 2, gave subjects a choice between following the gaze of a more expert
adult monkey or a less expert infant monkey and assessed which individual they preferred
to gaze follow. To assess which individual monkeys preferred, we first tested how subjects
responded in their first look behavior. To investigate this, we ran a two-tailed binomial test
for Trials 2-4 comparing whether more subjects than chance made a first look in the
direction of the adult gaze versus the infant gaze. Prior to running any analyses, we first
removed all trials where the individual made no first look. Binomial tests revealed that
subjects were not significantly more likely to make their first look in the same direction as
the adult gaze cue as compared to the infant cue in any of the Trial (Figure 8). In Trial 2, 34
out of 63 subjects looked in the same direction as the adult presented cue (proportion = 0.54,
p = 0.6147). Trial 3 showed the same pattern; 26 of 59 subjects first looked towards the adult
(proportion = 0.44, p = 0.435). Finally, in Trial 4, 25 of 49 subjects made their first look in
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the same direction as the adult cue, (proportion = 0.51, p = 0.50). Thus, even when presented
with a choice between two differentially-aged conspecifics, monkeys did not show a strong
preference for adults over infant conspecific presenters.
We then looked at our second dependent measure—overall looking time (seconds)—
to see if subjects spent more time looking in the direction of the adult photo versus the infant
photo. Overall, there was no significant difference in any of the gaze cue presentation trials
between subjects’ looking time in the direction of the adult cue as compared to the looking
time in the direction of the infant cue (Figure 9). This suggests that regardless of gaze cue
presentation, subjects do not show a preference for conspecifics of different ages.
Finally, we looked at the effect of subjects’ age on their gaze following preferences.
Prior to any data analysis, we first removed any trials where subjects made no look, or looked
at the ground or apparatus for the entirety of the trial. In Experiment 2, first look accuracy
indicated whether the subject’s first look was in the same direction as the adult cue; a first
look was coded as “inaccurate” if they first looked in the same direction as the infant cue.
Again, based on subject age, we split subjects into two age cohorts (juvenile < 5; adult > 5).
We ran a generalized linear mixed model with age cohort as a fixed effect and subject ID as
a random effect. Overall we found that adding age cohort did not improve model fit (χ2 =
1.37, P = 0.242). In other words, juveniles and adults show no significant difference in their
propensity to accurately gaze follow from a conspecific photo (Figure 11).
One possibility is that while juvenile and adult subjects did not differ in their first look
accuracy, they did spend a different amount of time looking in the same direction as the adult
gaze cue (Experiment 2). To test this, we ran a linear mixed model, and added age cohort as
a fixed effect and subject ID as a random effect. Adding age cohort did not improve model fit
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as compared to the base model (χ2 = 0.929, P = 0.335). In other words, different age subjects
did not show different amounts of looking time in the same direction as the adult cue (Figure
10).
Finally, consistent with some other studies investigating similar questions in social
learning, we were interested in whether subjects of different ages showed different levels of
social attention to the task. While juveniles and adults may not have been any more accurate,
they may have been attending differentially to the conspecific images presented across both
experiments. Here we looked at the effect of age cohort on dependent variable center looking
time, or overall time spent looking towards the apparatus and photos. Here we found that
adding subject age cohort significantly improved model fit (χ2 = 51.033, P < 0.0001). Across
both experiments (Figure 12), juveniles are spending a lot more time looking at the
apparatus and conspecific photos (M = 3.98 seconds, SD = 2.25) as compared to adults (M =
2.41 seconds, SD = 1.73).

Conclusion
Experiment 2 tested whether monkeys would track social expertise in a novel gaze
choice task. By presenting monkeys with two simultaneous but conflicting gaze cues from a
social expert (an adult monkey) versus a social novice (an infant monkey), we hoped to
provide a task more representative of a naturalistic situation that might elicit natural gaze
behavior responses from our subjects. In both of our dependent measures—first look
direction and overall looking time— subjects did not show a significant difference between
the two images. These results were contrary to our predictions that monkeys might track a
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social expert (i.e. an older conspecific) and preferentially follow the cues of that individual
over the cues of a younger infant conspecific. Instead, we found that even with this updated
choice paradigm, subjects showed no strong preferences for either cue presenter. We
similarly did not find any developmental differences in gaze behavior. Adult subjects were
no more likely to accurately look in the same direction as the adult cue, nor did they look
longer in the same direction as an adult cue, compared to juvenile subjects.

Discussion
The goal of these studies was to test whether rhesus monkeys tracked social expertise
in a gaze following task. We manipulated the social expertise of the presenter using age as a
proxy to see whether subjects preferentially followed the gaze of more expert individuals.
We predicted that if monkeys were able to track social expertise, then they should
preferentially follow the cues of adult monkeys as compared to infants. In Experiment 1, we
found no significant effect of cue presenter. First look data showed that subjects did not
accurately follow the gaze cue regardless of the identity of the presenter, though they did
look longer overall in trials where we presented a gaze cue as compared to trials where no
gaze cue was presented. These results suggest that although primates did track the gaze in
the photographs, they did not follow the gaze of adults more than that of infants as we had
hypothesized.
We were concerned that the results of Experiment 1 may have been due to the fact
that we presented the adult and infant cues in isolation as part of a between subjects design
and that subjects’ behavior may not have been indicative of real social interactions in which
monkeys often experience many individuals giving cues simultaneously. Experiment 2 tested
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this question directly with a novel paradigm that required subjects to make a choice in their
gaze behavior. In Experiment 2, subjects were presented with two simultaneous and
conflicting cues— adult and infant photos that looked in an opposite direction at the same
time. We reasoned that if socioecological validity was an issue in Experiment 1, then subjects
might follow the adult monkey cue over the infant one in this more ecologically-relevant
choice set up. Despite the new choice testing method, subjects still did not show a preference
for either cue presenter. We found that subjects did not differentially follow the cues from
either presenter even when presented with both cues at the same time.
Overall, our results from both Experiments 1 and 2 seem to suggest that subjects are
not tracking social expertise— at least based on subjects’ age— when following gaze. Taking
an additional step back, it appears that rhesus macaques may not even be reliably following
gaze from a photo of a conspecific, as their first looks in Experiment 1 were not more
“accurate” or in the same direction as the presenter, even though subjects did look longer
overall in response to a cue versus no cue.
One possible reason for the null results we obtained concern some limitations with
our experimental setup. For starters, it is not clear from our results that subjects are treating
photographic images of a conspecific as agentic. In Experiment 1, we incorporated photo
image movements in Trials 2-4 that mimicked the movement of a real monkeys’ intentional
gaze cue. Trials 2-4 in Experiment 1 began with two seconds of a photo of the conspecific
looking directly at the subject, followed by an image of the subject making a gaze cue either
left or right. While we made every effort to make the gaze photograph cue appear
naturalistic, it was still less dynamic than a live presentation. While previous work has
suggested that macaques will gaze follow from a static image (e.g. Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt,
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2006; Deaner & Platt, 2003), it is important to note that this work was carried out in a lab
setting in a much quieter social environment than our field testing site. In contrast to
laboratory-living monkeys, the macaques at Cayo Santiago have hundreds of groupmates to
attend to, and thus a static photographic image may not be salient enough to capture the
attention and direct the behavior of our subject macaques. It is possible, then, that follow-up
work using more dynamic gaze stimuli – such as video presentation – may elicit gaze
responses more in line with live human and conspecific demonstrators (Tomasello, Call, &
Hare, 1998; Teufel et al., 2010: Micheletta & Waller, 2012).
Another problem concerns the kind of identity cue we picked: expertise as marked by
an individual’s age. Primates may prefer to learn from some social categories when attending
to the cues of other agents, but age may not be one of them. To address this, one could test
whether primates attend differentially to conspecifics varying on other social dimensions.
For example, dominance plays a key role in the social lives of primates, making it a good
contender for social information that conspecifics might be attending to in a social task.
Work with other primates has found that subjects do seem attentive to rank cues in a social
learning context. In one study with vervets, researchers found that juvenile subjects showed
attentional biases to high-ranking over low-ranking demonstrators (Grampp et al., 2019).
Another task testing differences in gaze following responses showed that monkeys gaze
follow more in response to gaze cues from dominant individuals as compared to low ranking
individuals (Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt, 2006). Other research has found a similar effect of
sex on preference for informants in primates; in a social learning context, primates preferred
to learn information from dominant female versus dominant male (Van de Waal et al., 2010;
Renevey et al., 2013; Bono et al., 2018). In Experiments 1 and 2, we matched the presumed
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dominance rank of the two different conspecifics presented. However, given the consistent
preference for dominant individuals across experiments and species (Van de Waal et al.,
2010; Renevey et al., 2013; Bono et al., 2018; Grampp et al., 2019; Coelho et al., 2015; Deaner,
Shepherd, & Platt, 2006), future work could look at dominance as a marker for social
expertise.
Another future direction concerns individual differences driving looking behavior
differences. We found that while juveniles and adults were not different in their gaze
accuracy, they did show some differences in their gaze behavior. Overall, adults looked
longer than juveniles in the same direction as the cue presented (Experiment 1) and in the
same direction as the adult cue (Experiment 2). In contrast, we found that juveniles spend
more time attending to the experimental setup overall in both experiments. This pattern
matches previous studies that showed that younger individuals show higher rates of social
attention overall in social learning (Grampp et al., 2019), gaze following (Rosati et al., 2016),
and perspective understanding (Arre, Stumph, & Santos, 2021) tasks. The age difference we
observed may be because young individuals are practicing social skills, and learning how to
effectively learn from other agents. Thus, preferences for different agents may be strongest
during this critical learning phase, the juvenile period, but fade across the lifespan.
Consistent with this, we found that juveniles attended more to the task than adults.
Importantly, however, this did not result in improved task performance: juveniles were no
more likely than adults to be accurate in their first look behavior, or to look longer in the
cued direction. However, it is important to add a caveat here, as our sample sizes were fairly
small for this kind of developmental comparison (between 20-30 subjects within each age
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cohort). Thus, in future studies, we hope to collect a larger sample to look more closely at
how a subject’s own age affects gaze behavior responses.
We initially set out to ask whether primates would show human-like preferences for
different types of agents as sources of information. We know from work with human children
that from a young age, we do show strong preferences for older, reliable experts (Wood,
Kendal, & Flynn, 2012; Seehagen & Herbert, 2011; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Elekes & Kiraly,
2012; Kachel 2018; 2021). While we considered several possibilities for why we might not
have seen the same preferences in primates, one additional possibility is that a human-like
propensity to teach and attend to the instruction of others’, and experience successfully
learning from others, is required in order for us to generalize to what types of others are
good informants. Thus, we do not see this ability in primates because primates do not teach
as part of their natural social interaction, and are missing out on this type of experience early
on. Moving forward, examining whether other social categories can turn on human-like
preferences for different agents will be critical for determining whether this is definitively
the case, or whether our findings re the result of task constraints in the experiments
presented here.
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Dependent variable

Definition

Overall looking time

The time (in seconds) that the subject spent looking at the
apparatus out of 10 possible seconds
Same side looking time
The time (in seconds) that the subject spent looking in the
same direction as the presented cue out of 10 possible
seconds
Different side looking time
The time (in seconds) that the subject spent looking in the
direction opposite of the presented cue out of 10 possible
seconds
First look behavior
Whether the subject first looked in the same direction as the
presented cue, the direction opposite of the presented cue, or
made no look for the duration of the trial
First look accuracy
If the subject made a first look during the trial, whether the
look behavior was accurate
Number of looks back
The number of times the subject looks back to the apparatus
containing the conspecific photos
Number of looks in the same The number of times the subject looks in the same direction
direction
as the cue presented in that trial
Number of looks in the The number of times the subject looks in the direction
different direction
opposite of the cue presented in that trial
Table 1. In Experiment 1, behavioral coders recorded three looking time variables, which
allowed us to calculate the remaining five dependent variables.
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Trial

Cue Presenter

2

Infant

Average Looking Time SD
(seconds)
1.86
1.97

Adult

1.73

2.00

Infant

1.62

2.22

Adult

1.64

2.55

Infant

1.66

2.28

Adult

1.99

2.32

3

4

Table 2. In Study 2, there were no significant differences in any of the trials in the overall
time the subjects spent looking towards the same side as the adult versus the juvenile cue.
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Experiment 1 (n = 131; 71F, 59M; ~7.5 years)
Trials Completed
n
Exclusions
4
97
An additional 13 monkeys completed all 4
trials, but were excluded because they
were in the same group as the stimuli (n =
6), or because they had already completed
at least 1 trial of the experiment in an
earlier experimental session (n = 7).
3

2

9

25

Of the 9 monkeys that completed only 3 of
the 4 possible trials (n = 8) walked away
after the completion of the 3rd trial and
before the start of trial 4, and another
monkey (n = 1) stopped attending to the
experimental setup.
An additional monkey (n = 1) completed 3
trials but was excluded because they had
already completed at least 1 trial of the
experiment in an earlier experimental
session.
Of the monkeys that completed only 2
trials, some walked away (n = 20), others
stopped attending to the task (n = 4), or
were interfered with by another monkey (n
= 1).

Finally, four monkeys completed 2 trials
but were later excluded because at the time
of data entry it was determined to be in
group during the experimental session (n =
1), had already completed an experimental
session prior (n = 2), or because at the time
of clipping the videos because it was
determined that the subject was not
looking (n = 1) at the beginning of either
trial (i.e. “now”).
1
0
Monkeys needed to complete at least two
trials for the session to be considered
successful. In total, three monkeys were
excluded after completing only 1 trial
because they walked away (n = 5) before
the start of trial 2, or were interfered with
(n = 1).
SI Table 1. Subject demographics and exclusion details for Experiment 1, split by trial.
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Experiment 2 (n = 74; 33F, 41M; ~4.84 years)
Trials Completed
n
Exclusions
4
51
Four additional monkeys saw all four trials
of the experiment but had to be excluded
because they were repeats, or had
previously seen some portion of the
experiment.
3
14
Of the 14 subjects that completed only 3
trials, most of the experimental sessions
were ended when the subject walked away
(n = 10) and the remaining sessions ended
when another subject interfered with the
subject (n = 4).

2

1

9

0

After completing three trials, one
additional monkey was excluded from the
final dataset because it was a repeat, or had
previously seen some portion of the
experiment.
Of the nine monkeys that completed only 2
trials, some experimental sessions were
aborted because monkeys walked away
from the experiment (n = 7), or were
interfered with by another monkey (n = 2)
One additional monkey completed two
trials but had to be excluded because the
experimenters were unable to identify the
subject.
Monkeys needed to complete at least two
trials for the session to be considered
successful. In total, 10 monkeys were
excluded after completing only 1 trial
because they walked away (n = 5), stopped
attending (n = 2), were interfered with by
another monkey (n = 2), or approached the
experimental setup (n = 1) prior to
completion of a second trial.

SI Table 2. Subject demographics and exclusion details for Experiment 2, split by trial.
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Total Looking Time
(Pearson’s R)
Study 1: Adult condition
Center

0.952 (Allie Liebmann)

Left

0.932 (Ellen Stumph)

Right

0.901 (Amelia Linett)

Study 1: Infant condition
Center

0.963 (Ellen Stumph)

Left

0.914 (Ellen Stumph)

Right

0.96X (Katherine Ziska)

Study 2
Center

0.950 (Brooke Milosh)

Left

0.938 (Ellen Stumph)

Righ

0.943 (Katherine Ziska)

SI Table 3. Behavioral coding reliability, split by subject look direction.
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Figure 1. Experiment 1 apparatus. The foam core box had one windows to allow for the
presentation of gaze cues from an adult male or infant male conspecific.
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 stimuli. The first row depicts 6C6, a high-ranking adult male, and the
second row AT5, a high-ranking infant male. The first frame in each row depicts trial 1, the
encoding trial, while frames 2-4 depict the gaze following trials. The identity of the cue
presenter, and the direction in which the cue pointed (left or right) remained the same within
subjects but was counterbalanced across subjects.
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Figure 3. Experiment 1, first look behavior across all four trials. The y axis shows the
proportion of individuals that looked in the same direction as the cue on their first look.

164

Figure 4. Study 1, average looking time in the same direction as the cue presented across all
four trials. The y axis shows the average looking time in seconds of subjects within each trial.
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Figure 5. Study 1, average looking time in the same direction as the cue presented across all
four trials. The y axis shows the average looking time in seconds of subjects within each trial.
The plots are split by age cohort. Overall, we found an effect of age cohort on looking time,
where adults are looking longer in the same direction as the cue, as compared to juvenile
subjects.
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Figure 6. Experiment 2 apparatus. The foam core box had two windows to allow for
simultaneous presentation of gaze cues from female adult and infant conspecifics.
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Figure 7. Experiment 2 stimuli. The first row depicts 2E4, a high-ranking adult female, and
the second row i1900V, a high-ranking infant female. The first frame in each row depicts trial
1, the encoding trial, while frames 2-4 depict the gaze following trials. The identity of the cue
presenter, and the direction in which the cue pointed (left or right) remained the same within
subjects but was counterbalanced across subjects.
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Figure 8. Study 2, first look behavior across all four trials. The y axis shows the proportion
of individuals that looked in the same direction as the cue on their first look.
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Figure 9. Study 2, looking time behavior across all four trials. The y axis shows the average
looking time (seconds) in the direction of each cue presenter: infant cue presenter (dark
green) and adult cue presenter (light green).
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Figure 10. Experiment 2, average looking time in the same direction as the cue presented
across all four trials. The y axis shows the average looking time in seconds of subjects within
each trial. The plots are split by age cohort. Overall, we found no effect of age cohort on
looking time.
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Figure 11. Juvenile (left column) and adult (right column) subjects first look behavior across
Experiments 1 (row 1 = adult cue condition, and 2 = infant cue condition) and Experiment 2
(row 3). Experiment 2 used a simultaneous cue presentation where same = direction as the
adult cue and different = the direction of the infant cue.
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Figure 12. Juvenile (left column) and adult (right column) subjects’ social attention to the
experimental setup across Experiments 1 (row 1 = adult cue condition, and 2 = infant cue
condition) and Experiment 2 (row 3).
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Chapter 5: General Discussion and Conclusions

Humans undergo robust ontogenetic shifts in social cognitive abilities across early
life. To what degree are these transitions shared by other primates? In this dissertation, I set
out to explore whether different early life experiences affect the development of
sociocognitive abilities in non-human primates. Specifically, I looked at sociocognitive
development in rhesus macaques, which are among some of the most studied primate
subjects in the domain of social cognition. This expansive sociocognitive research (for a
review, see Drayton & Santos, 2016; Arre & Santos, in press) with adult macaques serves as
the perfect foundation to investigate how different early life experiences contribute to the
ontogeny of sociocognitive abilities. In Chapter 2, I investigated whether macaques share
similarities in the development of their visual representational abilities with humans. I
tested infant and juvenile macaques on a well-established task examining nonverbal
populations’ understanding of what others see (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Marticorena et
al., 2011; Luo, 2011; Martin & Santos, 2014). In Chapter 3, I tested whether the same capacity
for representing what others see is affected by early life experiences with different social
environments, and particularly, social tolerance. I tested adult Barbary macaques, a socially
tolerant species, using the same task, and compared their results to a previously collected
dataset in adults of a more socially despotic species, rhesus macaques. Finally, in Chapter 4,
I looked at the development of a different sociocognitive skill altogether, gaze following,
exploring whether attention to individuals with different social expertise changes across the
lifespan.
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The Role of Experience in Macaques’ Understanding of Visual Perspective Taking
Chapter 2 (Arre, Clark, & Santos, 2020) investigated the development of monkeys’
ability to represent what others can see. Previous work had shown that adult monkeys can
represent the perceptual states of others (Marticorena et al., 2011; Flombaum & Santos,
2005; Santos, Nissen, & Ferrugia, 2006), and that these representations appear flexible
(Drayton & Santos, 2017; Bettle & Rosati, 2019). However, we know very little about how
these abilities emerge, and whether they are present from birth or instead require
experience interacting with conspecifics. To address this, Chapter 2 tested younger monkeys
on a task previously validated with adult monkeys from the same population (Marticorena
et al., 2011), to see whether young monkeys also possess the ability to represent what others
can see. We chose monkeys of two age cohorts — infants and juveniles— selected to broadly
match the human life stages of infancy and early childhood respectively. Using this life stage
comparative approach, we found that unlike human infants (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005;
Träuble, Marinović, & Pauen, 2010; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010), infant rhesus
macaques do not predict that other agents will act based on their visual perspective. Older
juvenile macaques tested on the task (aged 1-5 years old), showed the opposite, trending in
the correct adult-like direction. However, unlike adults of the same population, these
juveniles also did not look significantly longer when an agent acted inconsistently with her
visual perspective. Instead, both infant and juvenile rhesus macaques looked equally long in
response to both the expected condition, when an experimenter acted consistently with her
visual perspective, and the unexpected condition, where the experimenter acted
inconsistently with her visual perspective.
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At least from this single experiment, my results suggest that young macaques do not
possess the capacity to understand others’ perceptions and form an expectation about how
another agent should act based on those perceptions. These results are in sharp contrast to
work with humans, even when directly comparing human and nonhuman subjects of the
same age. Human infants as young as 7 months appear capable of not only representing
where others will act based on their visual perspective (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Träuble,
Marinović, & Pauen, 2010; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Luo, 2011), but also more
complex abilities such as representing others’ false beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005;
Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; He, Bolz, and Baillargeon, 2011; Scott, et al., 2012). The
results of Chapter 2 suggest that infant macaques do not do the same.
Because we didn’t see significant effects in our current study, there are a few next
steps that would help clarify how infant macaques represent others’ visual perspective. The
first step would involve replicating my findings. Despite a non-significant difference within
both age cohorts, I did observe an interesting pattern when comparing cohorts. Namely,
while juveniles showed a pattern in the “correct” adult-like direction suggesting they may be
capable of representing what the agent can see, infant monkeys demonstrated the exact
opposite pattern, looking longer in the expected condition. If both of these results replicated
with significant within-cohort differences, we could begin to refine our interpretation of
what these results tell us. Most importantly, we would be able to verify whether monkeys do
in fact acquire the capacity to represent others’ awareness during the juvenile period. If that
result holds, we could then explore why this capacity emerges in monkeys during the juvenile
period. One possibility is that the capacity to represent others’ visual perspective requires
certain types of experiences in monkeys, ones that tend to occur before the juvenile period.
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Under this view, infant nonhuman primates are either not getting that experience early in
life or are getting a lot less of that experience than human infants. Human infants may get
more of this kind of experience early on in life such that they develop this capacity at an
earlier life stage than young monkeys. Another possibility is that visual perspective
representations are an innate capacity in human infants, but require experiential input in
monkeys. Under this view, the ability to make accurate predictions about an agent’s behavior
based on that agent’s perceptions begins at a very young age in human infants in the absence
of any required experience. This early capacity to represent others’ visual awareness may
then scaffold the development of more complex and later emerging mental representational
abilities that appear later on in human development. In contrast, rhesus monkeys might
require significant experiences to get this capacity of the ground. Before the juvenile period,
young monkeys begin spending more time on their own and engaging in more independent
interactions with conspecifics (Maestripieri & Hoffman, 2012; Maestripieri, 1994). Thus, it is
possible that monkeys’ capacity to represent others’ perceptual awareness comes online
during this period because of their experience attending to and using the visual awareness
of others. As a result, monkeys may not have time to develop more complex mentalizing
abilities before adulthood. This alternative explanation is supported by the fact that human
infants’ mentalizing abilities surpass those of even adult nonhuman primates by the age of 3
when human children appear capable of representing the false beliefs of others (Onishi &
Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; He, Bolz, and Baillargeon, 2011; Scott,
et al., 2012), a capacity that nonhuman primates likely never possess (Call & Tomasello 1999;
O’Connell & Dunbar, 2003; Kaminski et al. 2008; Krachun et al. 2009; Marticorena et al. 2011
Martin & Santos, 2014; but see Krupenye et al., 2016; Kano et al., 2019).
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Additionally, replicating the results of Chapter 2 would also allow us to better investigate
another curious feature of our findings: the fact that our infant cohort seemed to show a nonsignificant flipped result, in which they trended towards looking longer at the expected
condition, where the agent acted consistently with her visual perspective, as compared to
the unexpected condition. A replication would allow us to verify that subjects were indeed
discriminating the two conditions significantly. While this pattern was not what I originally
predicted, such a pattern would indicate that infant subjects were representing the two
scenes differently. The patten also fits with what is occasionally observed in looking time
studies in human infant populations who sometimes show a shorter looking response to
novel stimuli (Hunter & Ames, 1988; Houston-Price & Nakai, 2004). Thus, the infant results
in Chapter 2 could indicate the presence of a human-like neophobic response to new or
unusual stimuli, in other words, an agent acting inconsistently with her visual perspective. If
we observed this result, a generous interpretation could be that infant macaques do
understand that agents should act consistently with their visual perspective, and have a
preference for agents that do exactly this (or an aversion to the opposite case). While I tested
a fairly large infant sample size in Chapter 2 (n = 236), future work could replicate these
findings using a power analysis predicted sample size, and allow us to more concretely pin
down what we think is happening within each life stage.
Overall, though, the current Chapter 2 results suggest that experience plays a role in the
development of macaques’ early abilities to represent what others see, begging the question
of what types of experiences specifically might play a role in this ontogeny? Future work could
test this open question. Specifically, future work could test whether young primates do
indeed require repeated exposure to seeing others act in accordance with their visual
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perspective in order to make the same predictions as a human infant would on our task.
Getting that kind of experiential input could be critical for monkeys to develop
representations for how another agent should act when they can see the location of a hidden
object. As noted above, it’s possible that human infants either don’t need such experience or
get more interactions of this nature from a younger age, as compared to nonhuman primates.
For example, as compared to primate infants, human infants disproportionately experience
non-verbal referential gestures or other cues that give them practice engaging with and
representing the perspective of others (Tomasello, 2019; Tomasello, 2018). Young infants
get this type from parents and other caregivers, and even start reliably making their own
pointing gestures around a year (Leung & Rheingold, 1981; Carpenter et al., 1998; Masataka,
2003), an ability that primates never acquire (Leavens & Hopkins, 1988a; Leavens &
Hopkins, 1988b). Subsequently, primates are left to interpret more subtle cues like eye
direction and other attentional cues, while human infants have more direct gesture abilities
like pointing at their disposal, with which provide human-unique feedback from a fairly
young age. As such, it is possible that this early exposure to using and producing pointing
and other gestures for objects and agents in the environment accelerate human infants’ early
social cognitive abilities, and that nonhuman primates’ social cognition builds slower across
early development in the absence of these types of scaffolding experiences.
In Chapter 3 (Arre, Stumph, & Santos, 2021), I attempted to address the question of which
early life experiences are needed to develop the capacity to represent what others see by
testing two primate species with different early social environments. I tested two macaque
species that have different socioecological environments—cooperative and competitive—
and compared the species’ abilities to represent what others can see. Two competing
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theories have argued that experience representing and using others’ perceptual perspectives
in either cooperative or competitive contexts could have shaped early human evolution. The
first theory, the survival of the friendliest hypothesis (Hare & Woods, 2020) argues that our
human unique social cognition is the result of a hyper-friendliness and willingness to
cooperate (Hare & Woods, 2020; Hare, 2017; Hermann, et al., 2017; Tomasello, 2019). Under
this view, experience interpreting and using the social cues of others to cooperate, work
together, and engage in joint activities is what drove human-like social cognition to emerge.
The second theory, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, argues instead that
competition drove our unique human specific cognition; by exploiting the mental states of
others we were able to out compete one another for resources, food, shelter, and mating
opportunities (Whiten & Byrne, 1997). Under this view, experience using others’ social cues
or interpreting the perceptual or mental states of others for our own personal gain is what
catalyzed human-like social cognition to emerge.
I tested these two theories by exploring if visual perspective understanding was more
robust in adults of a more cooperative macaque species— the Barbary macaque— versus a
more despotic, competitive macaque species, the rhesus monkey. Surprisingly, I found that,
despite these different early life experiences in social tolerance, adult rhesus and Barbary
macaques were equally adept at representing what another agent can see. Adult subjects of
both species successfully predicted how the experimenter would act based on what she saw,
suggesting that early experience with different social tolerances did not affect adult subjects’
capacity to represent what others see.
Why don’t these two macaque species show differences in their ability to represent
others’ visual perspectives? One possible explanation for the findings I observed in Chapter
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3 is that the specific ability that I chose to test— the capacity to represent what others see—
is not directly affected by early life differences in social tolerance. For this reason, future
studies might need to test a more complex or variable sociocognitive ability to find true
tolerance-based differences. A related possibility is that while experience may play a role in
the ontogeny of monkeys’ capacity to represent what others see, experience with
environments of different social tolerance may not be the correct type of social experience
to vary in order to test this question. It’s possible that the capacity to represent what others
see plays a fundamental role in being a successful social primate regardless of whether
you’re using these representations to cooperate or compete with other individuals.
An additional puzzle concerns the contrasting results that I observed in Chapters 2 and
3. The results of Chapter 2 suggested that early experience likely does play a role in the
development of the capacity to represent what others see, but Chapter 3 shows that
differential experiences in social tolerance do not map onto differences in this capacity, at
least in adult subjects. In short, experience seem to does matter for the development of this
capacity (Chapter 2), but the specific experiences I varied in Chapter 3— social tolerance—
does not seem to matter. Note, however, that the results in Chapter 3 do not preclude the
possibility that other features of a species’ early social environment could affect the capacity
to represent what others see. For instance, in the introduction, I discussed the social brain
hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998), which argued that experiences living in large groups has led to
proportional increases in brain regions implicated in social cognition (Dunbar & Schultz,
2007). Some work has tested this possibility directly in adult subjects (e.g. MacLean et al.,
2013; Sandel, MacLean, & Hare, 2011), but has not yet used the comparative developmental
approach that I employ here. Thus, future work could test the role that social group size plays
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in the development of visual perspective understanding ability by comparing primate
species that vary in their natural group sizes using the same task in Chapters 2 and 3. If the
social brain hypothesis were correct (Dunbar, 1998), I would predict that sociocognitive
abilities would develop earlier and faster in species who grew up larger groups. These results
would suggest that social group size might be a better feature of social environment with
which to predict sociocognitive development. Further, such results would also hint that,
similar to our conclusions in Chapter 2, experience interacting with others’ and observing
others interacting with their environment, is critical for primates to develop the ability to
represent what others can see.
Another way to explain the discrepancy in Chapters 2 and 3 concerns a limitation of
Chapter 3 regarding subjects’ ages. While I hypothesized that early life experiences with
social environments of differing tolerance might lead to the development of different social
cognitive abilities in adulthood, it might be the case that these differences are only visible in
early life while social skills are still crystallizing. Thus, I might have failed to reveal any true
effect of species-specific experiences because any such differences in sociocognitive
development might have leveled out by the time I tested subjects in adulthood. Under this
account, I might have observed more species differences if I had tested subjects before they
reached adulthood. The results of Chapter 2 suggest that rhesus macaques develop visual
perspective representations at a slower pace than humans, but still reach adult-like
competencies by age five. It is possible that because our subject population in Chapter 3 was
made up of mostly adults, I may have seen bigger differences had I tested subjects closer to
the juvenile period of ages 2-5 years. To answer this definitively, future studies should
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explicitly test young subjects in this critical early development period during which
sociocognitive abilities are maturing.

The Role of Experience in Macaques’ Social Learning Capacities
In Chapter 4, (Arre, Stumph, Hengartner, Santos, in prep), I looked at the development
of a different but related sociocognitive ability, choosing which individual to gaze follow and
learn from. We know from human developmental work that children differentially attend to
people that they deem to be efficient teachers, (Zmyj et al., 2010; Nielsen & Blank, 2011;
Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Jaswal & Malone, 2007; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012;
Seehagen & Herbert, 2011; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Elekes & Kiraly, 2012), and children prefer
teachers who demonstrate reliability (Zmyj et al., 2010; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Birch,
Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Chow et al., 2008), confidence (Jaswal & Malone, 2007), and are
older (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012; Seehagen & Herbert, 2011; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Elekes
& Kiraly, 2012; Kachel et al., 2018; 2021). Some scholars have suggested that this capacity is
a product of our unique learning-focused culture (Tomsello, 2018; 2019). From a young age,
humans are poised to attend to informants who they mark as experts (Kachel et al., 2018;
2021). This ability may allow human children to learn from useful others more rapidly and
effectively. However, we do not yet know whether a preference for certain identities of
informants is unique to our hyper teaching and learning centric culture, or whether a similar
capacity may be conserved across our less teaching-inclined primate relatives.
In Chapter 4, I sought to address this question by testing adult and juvenile macaques
on a novel gaze following task. I tested whether juvenile and adult subjects followed gaze
differently depending on the gazing monkey’s level of social expertise (operationalized by
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altering whether the gaze cue was presented by an older more knowledgeable monkey face
or a younger more naïve monkey face). Across two experiments, I found that individuals of
both age cohorts – juveniles and adults – failed to attend differentially to conspecifics with
differing social expertise. In Experiment 1 and 2, subjects showed no difference in the extent
to which they followed gaze cues based on the presenter’s level of expertise, with subjects of
both age cohorts showing equal levels of gaze following to both an adult and infant
conspecific photo. Importantly, I observed no significant change in task performance across
the lifespan— juveniles and adults spent the same amount of time gaze following in response
to the gaze cue, and showed no age cohort level differences in the accuracy of their first look
behavior. Finally, subjects showed relatively low rates of gaze following overall, suggesting
that perhaps the task was not effective at eliciting gaze responses.
There are a few reasons why subjects in Chapter 4 may have failed to robustly gaze
follow on my task. The first concerns the specific agents we chose as targets of subjects’ gaze
following. Specifically, we presented subjects with photos of outgroup members in our task.
I chose to use outgroup photos to prevent the possibility that the individual in the photo was
near to the experimental setup when one of their group members was being tested. However,
it is possible that monkeys are less likely to follow the gaze of an outgroup monkey. Indeed,
the developmental literature on social learning has found that human children show a strong
ingroup bias when learning from others, preferentially attending to information from more
similar or more familiar others’ (Learmonth et al., 2005; Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Lucas et
al., 2017; Gruber et al., 2019; Buttleman et al., 2013). While it is possible that these ingroup
preferences are a unique feature of our culture (Tomasello, 2019), rhesus macaques also live
in large groups that exhibit aggressive intergroup interactions and strict group boundaries
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(Maestripieri & Hoffman, 2013), and we know very little about how monkeys attend to
ingroup versus outgroup members. Although rhesus macaques do not share all of the
elements of human culture, as a function of their large and aggressive group living, they may
show hints of some of the same ingroup biases that human children do. Thus, Chapter 4 may
have failed to observe any real looking time differences not because monkeys can’t socially
learn from others monkeys’ gaze per se but because our subjects were unwilling to follow
the gaze of outgroup members. Future work could address this, and more importantly, the
broader question of whether monkeys share many of our ingroup biases or whether this is a
unique feature of human culture, by replicating the experiment using ingroup photos or by
testing macaques on a version of this task where the conspecific photos varied in group
status.
A second reason for the null results I found in Chapter 4 concerns the rank status of
the photos I used in my study. I chose photos of high-ranking individuals as conspecific
models because previous work demonstrated that high-ranking individuals would be
especially interesting to conspecifics (Watson et al., 2012; Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt, 2006).
I also reasoned that dominance might serve as a primate-like version of a social feature that
human children show strong social learning preferences: competence (Birch, Vauthier,
Bloom, 2008; Chow, Poulin-Dubois, & Lewis, 2008; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; for a review
see Mills, 2013). But it’s possible that subjects failed to follow gaze in our task specifically
because we used high-ranking photos. Indeed, there are reasons that subjects might prefer
to follow the gaze of low-ranking rather than high-ranking individuals. Research shows that
high-raking alpha individuals undergo a lot of stress and show high levels of circulating
stress-related hormones (Sapolsky, 1992), especially in species like the rhesus macaques
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that we tested here (Higham, Heistermann, & Maestripieri, 2013). Thus, highest-ranking
individuals might not be the best to attend to, as their high circulating stress levels might
prohibit them from properly attending to the environment around them. Based on this logic,
monkeys might recognize that other lower-ranking conspecifics might be better sources of
information. I could test this possibility in future work by using photos with differing levels
of dominance (rather than merely varying the conspecific photos’ age, as we did in Chapter
4). Although previous lab results show that rhesus monkeys attend more to the social
information presented by high-ranking, as compared to low-ranking others (Shepherd,
Deaner, and Platt, 2006), monkeys living in semi-naturalistic conditions might learn that
high-ranking individuals are not as useful for learning about the environment. Under this
view, we would expect perhaps the opposite pattern of results than what others’ have seen
in the lab, where when given the option, subjects preferred information from low-ranking
individuals, as compared to high-ranking individuals. This pattern of results would suggest
that humans are using different, and perhaps unique, markers of expertise, like age and
competence, ones that are not shared by other socially living primates.
The new task developed in Chapter 4 also presents an interesting opportunity to
address some of the open questions presented by Chapter 3. For instance, I discussed the
possibility that the results from Chapter 3— ones showing that social tolerance did not play
a role in the ontogeny of the ability to represent what others see (Arre, Stumph, & Santos,
2021)— were due in part to the possibility that social tolerance was not the right ability to
test the question of the role of social environment in social cognition. As discussed in my
introduction, primates’ social environments vary along many other features beyond social
tolerance. For instance, the two species that we tested in Chapter 3, rhesus and Barbary
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macaques, also vary in the way that they treat conspecifics of different ages. Specifically,
rhesus macaques seem not to discriminate much between adults and infant others in their
social behaviors, whereas Barbary macaques preferentially attend to and will go to great
lengths to interact with infant conspecifics (Whiten, 1987; Maestripieri, 1998) even
exchanging other social behaviors, like grooming, for infant handling opportunities (Deag,
1980; Paul, Kuester, & Arnemann, 1996), and using infants as “social buffering” tools to
deescalate antagonistic interactions (Taub, 1980; Deag, 1980; Deag & Crook, 1971). Thus,
Barbary macaques might be uniquely poised to explore the question of whether experience
plays in monkeys’ abilities to track social expertise, as Barbary macaques have more
experience interacting with individuals across different ages than rhesus macaques do
(Maestripieri, 1998). Future work could test this question directly by running the same study
I ran in Chapter 4 with Barbary macaque subjects. If experience interacting with others’
varying in their social expertise is a pre-requisite for the human-like expertise tracking that
human children show (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012; Seehagen & Herbert, 2011; Jaswal &
Neely, 2006; Elekes & Kiraly, 2012; Kachel et al., 2018; 2021), then one would expect to see
more human-like performance in Barbary macaques than rhesus macaques, the former of
whom get more of this experience engaging with conspecifics across the lifespan as part of
their social ecology.
The results of Chapter 4 also beg the question of whether gaze following was the
correct behavior to choose when studying the question of social learning. Historically, some
have argued that primate gaze following is largely a reflexive behavior, not one that indicates
any sort of mental state representation (Povinelli & Giambrone, 1999). Furthermore,
relative to other types of information seeking behaviors, like searching or physical
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manipulation of an object, gaze following is a low-cost activity both in terms of energy
expenditure and opportunity cost; gaze followers need not even move their heads to gaze
follow, as even saccades in the same direction as the cue would give them visual access. Thus,
subjects in the task might be gaze following indiscriminately regardless of the cue
presenter’s identity. There are a couple of problems with this interpretation. First, we know
from previous work in rhesus macaques that subjects do not gaze follow indiscriminately. In
gaze following tasks with repeated trials, subjects will habituate in response to noninformational cues, gaze following less across trials when they learn that the presenter is not
providing useful information (Rosati et al., 2016). Additionally, other work has shown that
rhesus macaques are sensitive to the knowledge state of the presenter during a gaze
following task, and only gaze follow when they believe they have something to learn from
gaze following from that individual (Drayton & Santos, 2017). The low-cost, indiscriminate
gaze following account also does not explain the results in Chapter 4, where we observed
relatively low rates of gaze following, averaging around 1 second, across two experiments.
Nonetheless, future work could test this directly, by designing a task that used a more costly
social learning activity like searching or physical object manipulation. If macaque failed our
task because our gaze following task was too low cost, then subjects should show more
discrimination when learning from more socially expert agents in a more costly task.
It is also important to consider the results of Chapter 4 in the context of previous work
on gaze following in this same population. Chapter 4 found that subjects overall showed low
rates of gaze following in response to a cue. This result contrasts with previous work done
in this population, which has demonstrated that rhesus monkeys do gaze follow robustly in
response to live human demonstrator (Rosati et al., 2016; Drayton & Santos, 2017; Bettle &
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Rosati, 2019). What might be causing this difference between the experiments presented
here and the previous work conducted with this population? A critical methodological
difference is that presenters in the previous, successful, tasks all used live human
demonstrators (Rosati et al., 2016; Drayton & Santos, 2017; Bettle & Rosati, 2019), whereas
my task (Chapter 4) used photographs of conspecifics. While there is precedent for
successfully using static image presentations to study gaze following in rhesus macaques
(e.g. Emery et al., 1997; Deaner, Shepherd, and Platt, 2010; Lorincz et al., 2000) and other
primates (e.g. Ruiz et al., 2009; Horton & Caldwell, 2006), these previously successful studies
were conducted with lab populations, whose environments might be otherwise less noisy.
Subjects in lab environments might have overall less social input and be more inclined to
attend to a less interesting task than a wild population living in a large group. In other words,
subjects in the rich social environment at Cayo Santiago may not have been as interested in
attending to photographs in the same way that lab animals might be. While I mention this
methodological limitation mostly to explain the low rates of looking in the task overall, it
could also be a contributing factor to the lack of difference we see in attentional difference
to adults and infant informants. If wild populations are not treating photographs as agentic
at all, it is unlikely that they would ascribe any sort of informational or expertise state to
either conspecifics’ photograph either. Future work could test whether the lack of dynamic
movement in this task was a factor in task performance, by designing a task using more
dynamic stimuli in the future.
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What Have We Learned About the Development of Macaque Social Cognition?
Overall, the pattern of results across the three chapters presented in this dissertation
suggest that different types of experience play a role in the development of social cognitive
abilities like understanding what others see and a preference for gaze following to
knowledgeable informants, but also that more work is needed in order to identify which
types of experiences exactly are important. Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that macaques do not
show robust developmental changes in some sociocognitive abilities, such as representing
what others see (Chapter 3) and an understanding of whom to gaze follow from (Chapter 4).
In Chapter 3, I found that the ability to represent what others see does not seem sensitive to
early life experiences involving varying levels of social tolerance; subjects that had years of
early-life experience in a socially tolerant environment were no better at forming an
expectation for how an agent should act based on her perspective than subjects that had
more socially-intolerant early life experiences. However, we still need more work to address
whether other features that primates’ social environment vary on, like social group size or
social structure, play a role in sociocognitive development. In Chapter 4, I found that juvenile
and adult monkeys do not appear differentially sensitive to the social experience of an agent
presenting a gaze cue, although this pattern was also consistent with the possibility that both
ages of subjects failed to gaze follow overall. Follow-up tests should look at whether other
traits are better markers of expertise, and thus more salient, in a gaze following
discrimination task. Further, future work will benefit from using natural features of
primates’ social ecology, like the way that Barbary macaques treat adult versus infant
conspecifics, to address the question about the role of experience with different aged agents
in primates’ abilities to ascribe different levels of expertise to conspecifics. The overall
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pattern observed in Chapters 3 and 4 comes in contrast to Chapter 2, where I found that
monkey infants failed to represent the visual perspective of another agent, suggesting that
there is in fact developmental change in this capacity which emerges only after the first years
of life and thus likely after some type of critical social experience.
Taken together, I’ve found evidence that experience may play a role in the ontogeny of at
least one sociocognitive ability in monkeys—representing what other see— but the
particular window in which such experience takes its effect may be rather narrow. In
Chapter 2, I identified that monkeys show a developmental delay in their ability to represent
what others see relative to human infants. However, the specific type of experience
responsible for this developmental pattern was unclear. Chapter 3 begins to rule out the
possibility that experience with different social tolerances played a role in the development
of this visual perspective taking capacity, though sadly the study was unable to subjects at
younger ages preventing us from making too strong of claims about the role of social
tolerance in the early development of representing what others can see. Finally, Chapter 4
was somewhat difficult to interpret based on the limited gaze following I observed
throughout the study. It’s possible that when presented with more dynamic stimuli, subjects
might show more flexible behavioral responses to gaze cues which would allow us to probe
this capacity for developmental patterns as I did using the visual perspective-taking task in
Chapters 2 and 3. While these studies cannot rule out some of the alternative explanations,
one fair interpretation is that primate subjects require a little more experience interacting
with and interpreting the social cues and visual perspectives of other agents before being
able to accurately predict another agent’s behavior. Future work could continue
investigating the lives of young monkey subjects to better understand which abilities show
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developmental differences in the young human and nonhuman primate, and whether the
findings here are unique to social abilities or true of cognitive developmental differences
across primates more broadly.
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